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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper presents a novel method for understanding how the Supreme Court constructs 
identities. Applying Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality to pivotal Supreme Court 
decisions which solidified gay identity were analyzed using Bowers v. Hardwick, Romer v. 
Evans, and Lawrence v. Texas. The results of this investigation show that the Court’s 
construction of gay identity changed with each case, sculpted by what they perceived at the 
time  as most productive for  American society. The work presented here has profound 
implications for the future study of the Supreme Court and contributes to our understanding 
of the workings of institutions in the modern world. 
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 Judging Sodom: 
Gay Identity in Bowers, Romer & Lawrence 
Introduction 
This paper is about the Supreme Court’s decisions in three landmark gay rights cases. 
It tracks the Court’s thinking as it changed from criminalization of gay intimate sexual 
relations, in 1986, to reversing this decision in 2003. This paper is an analytics of 
government, an analysis of the conditions that create specific institutions and ways of doing 
things, how they emerge, exist, and change.
1
 This type of study seeks to explain the 
emergence of a particular set of practices, for example, the Supreme Court’s analysis of gay 
and lesbian sexual identity, examine the sources of the elements that constitute the practice, 
and follow how these practices have developed into stable ways of doing things.
2
 An 
analytics of government examines how these practices become institutions, how they create 
and rely upon particular forms of knowledge and how the institution reforms itself and this 
knowledge, over time.
3
 It looks to the ways in which the Supreme Court has been 
instrumental in defining the ways in which the state has perceived, created perceptions, and 
managed the sexual practices of Americans. In this thesis, I will argue that Supreme Court  
decision-making in gay rights cases was based on how it perceived the productivity of gay 
identity in each case. I argue that in each instance: Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), Romer v. 
Evans (1996), and Lawrence v. Texas (2003), the Supreme Court, driven by the logic of 
governmentality, came to form an identity for gay people based on what was most useful and 
                                                          
1
 Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, 2
nd
 Edition (London: SAGE 
Publications, 2010), 30-31. 
2
 Ibid, 31. 
3
 Ibid.  
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productive for society. For this paper, the explicit construction of sexual identities means 
what the Court has laid out within the text of its decisions. Implicit construction involves 
what the Court has neglected to mention: the many assumptions about gays and straights that 
are taken for granted. This is an important field of study because of the immense power of 
the Supreme Court. Specifically, the Court has the authority to interpret the Constitution and 
define what laws mean. As law professor James Boyd White puts it: 
The criticism of opinions, on all these grounds-rational, political, and moral-is an 
essential part of the activity of law. It is crucial to the legal practice, for it is on the 
basis of such criticism that one will argue for or against the authority of a particular 
opinion or line of opinions. The opinion is not merely an epiphenomenon to the 
law…but is central to the activities of mind and character of the law as we know and 
value it.
4
 
Its decisions have also had an enormous impact on American culture by deciding such things 
as who can marry whom, who is entitled to citizenship, and how different groups are allowed 
to interact with each other in public. It has played an extensive role in defining  group 
identity for subcultures and how those groups are perceived in American society. For 
example, cases such as Plessy v. Ferguson and Brown v. Board of Education have helped 
shape the identity of African-Americans. In Brown v. Board of Education, Chief Justice Earl 
Warren described the position of African-Americans in the South under segregation; he 
found that, “To separate [African-American children] from others of similar age and 
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in 
                                                          
4
 James Boyd White, “What’s an Opinion For?,” University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 6, 1995, 1368. 
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the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”5 
Chief Justice Warren goes on to state that public education, the cornerstone of American 
society, teaches children everything they need to know to become fully formed citizens and 
adults.
6
 Through this line of reasoning, Chief Justice Warren helped cement, in the broader 
American consciousness, the sense that African-Americans were not as fully developed 
people as white Americans because they have not traditionally received the same quality of 
education. Relying on this logic, he overturns segregation in an effort to bring about equity 
for African-Americans in education. Those in the legal profession are keenly aware of the 
impact that the law has on the lives of those people that the law directly affects, but also on 
the legal practitioners themselves, how they come to view the law and their place within it. 
James Boyd White argues that, “the way [an] opinion is written has large consequences for 
the future. It deeply affects and shapes the way we think and argue and, in so doing, 
constitute ourselves through the law.”7 This is because the opinions of courts do not merely 
reflect yes or no votes on the correctness of any given law, but are arguments that lay in 
detail the justifications for their decisions. Studying the details and character of judicial 
decisions is important because so much of what is constituted as the law and legal reasoning 
has not come from statutes or even the direct text of the Constitution. Much of the law has 
emerged through interpretations that have created doctrines and legal mechanisms based on 
interpretations of these texts.  Studying the Court’s construction of gay identity is important 
because of the Court’s ability to control legal recognition and protection of groups of people, 
as well as shape their own views on the law. 
                                                          
5
 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), p.495. 
6
 Ibid, p. 494. 
7
 James Boyd White, p. 1368. 
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I focus on three conceptions of gay and lesbian identity: the “criminal other” of 
Bowers v. Hardwick, the “just like everyone else” of Romer v. Evans, and the “just-like 
straights” identity of Lawrence v. Texas.  How did the Court perceive alternative sexual 
orientations in Bowers? How did this reading affect straight relationships? How did this 
change with Romer and Lawrence? How did state intervention in the sexual lives change 
under Lawrence? What new rights were granted? What new responsibilities were outlined? 
These are important questions because the Supreme Court’s decisions have an impact on the 
law, the decisions of lower courts, the decisions and thinking of members of Congress and 
the executive, and they hold weight with the public. 
 The paper is divided into six parts. In the first section, I will discuss Michel 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality and its significance for a study of the Supreme Court. 
Second, in the literature review, I will address what other scholars have said about the 
Supreme Court’s role in identity construction of groups. The third section will discuss the 
Court’s conception of gays as criminals in Bower v. Hardwick. The fourth section will cover 
the Court’s conception of gays as a damaged group in need of protection in Romer v. Evans. 
Fifth, I will discuss how the Court has come to view gays as “just like” straights in Lawrence 
v. Texas. Finally, I will conclude the paper with an analysis of my argument. 
Literature Review 
 Legal opinions have broad impact on the political, legal, and economic lives of 
people. Legal, political, and literary scholars have attempted to decipher the meanings of 
these three cases and determine how they affect the legal and social standing of the gay and 
lesbian community in the United States. Three major approaches have driven the scholarship 
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on gay rights. This literature review will examine a variety of scholars’ approaches to 
analyzing the Court’s decisions in Bowers, Romer, and Lawrence. It will explore their 
strengths and weaknesses, in comparison to my own work in order to place my study within 
this research and to distinguish my study from other literature.
8
 The first focus will 
investigate these Supreme Court rulings through the lens of queer theory. Queer theory is a 
way of conceiving of gender, sex, and sexual orientation that has been adopted by scholars 
from a large number of disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. Queer theory uses 
“the post-structuralist figuring of identity as a constellation of multiple and unstable 
positions… [and] analytical models which dramatize incoherencies in the allegedly stable 
relations between chromosomal sex, gender and sexual desire” to reveal the socially 
constructed nature of gender and sexual identity.
9
  In the second section, I look at how law 
and literature scholars have studied Supreme Court decisions.
10
 What seems important about 
their viewpoint is: their emphasis on narratives, character portrayal, and voice in judicial 
opinions. This differs from the view of legal scholars who seem to be more interested in 
studying the specific mechanisms of a decision.
11
 Queer theorists focus on the broader socio-
political categories of subjects at play in a decision. Third, I look to legal scholarship on gay 
rights that focuses on the specific legal mechanisms that govern decisions. Finally, I chart a 
                                                          
8
 My research most closely resembles, and takes many elements from, queer theory research. Authors such as 
Kathrine Franke and Teemu Ruskola have reached the same conclusion that Lawrence uses a “just like straight” 
logic to come to its conclusion, see note 15. What these scholars lack, however, is a logical framework, 
governmentality, that explains the motives of institutions. This, of course, is something that my paper possesses 
and sets my paper apart from other scholars. 
9
 Annamarie Jagose (1996), “Queer Theory”, Australian Humanities Review, 
http://www.australianhumanitiesreview.org/archive/Issue-Dec-1996/jagose.html (accessed September 15, 
2014). 
10
 This is an interdisciplinary movement from scholars of English, rhetoric, communications, and law that has 
tried to study the law as a literary text. Prominent scholars in the “law and literature” movement include: 
Benjamin N. Cardozo, Ronald Dworkin, Eric Heinze, Ian Ward, Robin West, and James Boyd White. 
11
 By specific legal mechanisms I mean the study of law that focuses on the specifics of legal reasoning such as: 
the interpretation of the Due Process Clause, the interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, the notion of 
heightened scrutiny, a myriad of other things. 
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different approach which focuses on the logic of governmentality present in judicial decision-
making, and I point to arguments and ideas that these other approaches have missed. 
In this first section, I will discuss queer theory. Queer theory concepts such as the 
construction of social/sexual identities, performativity, and heteronormativity, have 
influenced how these scholars interpret the decisions of the Supreme Court.
12
 This has 
allowed theorists to shed light on the ways in which the courts and laws shape how we act 
and how we perceive ourselves and others.
13
 Queer theorists have focused on the power 
differential between different social groups, particularly the privileged position that 
heterosexuality possesses in society. It brings to light the privileged position of 
heterosexuality, especially the straight, married couple in terms of economic, political, and 
social benefits afforded by the state. Examples of this are present in the tax breaks given to 
straight couples who have children, but were denied to gay and lesbian couples with children. 
In the court system, child custody invariably favors the heterosexual partner and by default, 
inheritance only recognizes biological and matrimonial relationships.,, 
                                                          
12
 Some of the foundational texts of queer theory include: Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An 
Introduction, Vol. 1, trans. by Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990) and Judith Butler, Gender 
Trouble, New York: Routledge, 1990. 
13
 For examples of this look to Kathrine M. Franke, “The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas,” 
Columbia Law Review 104 (2004), 1399-1426; Marc Spindelman, “Surviving Lawrence v. Texas,” Michigan 
Law Review 102 (2003-2004), 1615-215; Teemu Ruskola, “Gay Rights Versus Queer Theory: What is Left of 
Sodomy after Lawrence v. Texas?” Social Text 23, no. 3-4 (Fall-Winter 2005): 235-249; Thomas M. Keck, 
“Queering the Rehnquist Court,” Political Research Quarterly 59 (2006): 417-419; Susan Burgess, “Queer 
(Theory) Eye for the Straight (Legal) Guy: Lawrence v. Texas’ Makeover of Bowers v. Hardwick,” Political 
Research Quarterly 59 (2006): 401-414; Unkown, “Unfixing Lawrence,” Harvard Law Review 118 (2005): 
2858-2881; Janet Halley, “Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick,” 
Virginia Law Review 79 (1993): 1721-1780; Janet Halley, “Romer v. Hardwick,” University of Colorado Law 
Review 68 (1997): 429-452.  
 7 
 
Queer theory has several important claims that are essential to it as a theoretical 
paradigm.
14
 First, sexuality is central to the construction of political meaning and power.
15
 
Burgess notes that political meaning is invested in the categorization of things and people 
that are often thought of in terms of oppositional binary social categories, “e.g., gay/straight; 
reason/desire; white/black; man/woman.”.”16 Each term in the pair is defined in relation to its 
opposite and therefore their meaning are intertwined – their existence is dependent on the 
other.
17
 At the same time an unequal power relationship exists between these binaries with 
the minority being accorded “various forms of material inequalities such as unequal rights 
and liberties.”18 
Second, Burgess argues that identity is performative in the sense that identities, 
including sexual orientation and gender, are created and perpetuated through acting them out 
rather than a natural phenomenon that exist a priori within a person. Queer theorists argue 
that these binary social categories are not natural but are, in fact, produced within specific 
communities in specific historical contexts.
19
 For Burgess the “ubiquity of how-to books for 
heterosexual dating and mating, as well as the painful adolescent memories that most people 
have of inadvertently breaking one of the unspoken rules of gender and sexuality, suggest 
that such norms are learned rather than given.”20 Third, political liberation can be best 
understood as a parody of existing social relations and identities instead of an escape from 
power relations. This is because of the performative nature of identity. No self or identity 
                                                          
14
 Burgess, 403. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid. 
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exists abstractly in nature, so the struggle to find and maintain an identity on the basis that it 
is natural presents itself as either naïve or potentially dangerous.
21
 Instead of a sincere 
struggle to discover hidden natural identities, queer theorists seek to employ parody that 
seeks to “dislodge seemingly natural assumptions about sexuality and gender be revealing the 
shaky grounds upon which firmly enshrined discourse rests.”22 Burgess, drawing on the 
example given by Judith Butler, points to the example of the drag queen who offers theatrical 
and often highly exaggerated performances of gender and sexual roles which reveals the 
constructed and performed nature of the roles.
23
 There are many sites of contestations of 
political power, and popular culture can provide insights into the everyday operation of 
political power that has the potential to transform it rather than merely mirror it.
24
   
Queer theory legal scholarship has been focused on “how” questions.25 This calling 
into question of how the governing of the “conduct of conduct” has been termed 
“problemitization” by Foucault scholars.26 However, these scholars have mostly focused on 
the macro-level cultural trends taking place in the Western world. They have mostly ignored 
specific institutions and how they have played a role in shaping views on sexuality. They 
have also placed less emphasis on why things occur the way they do.
27
 Instead they look to 
how each individual part of an institution works to create the practice at hand: from 
unemployment benefits to advertising. Dean contrasts this approach with other schools of 
                                                          
21
 This shows up in many of the categorizations that humans have created but it often is most plainly visible in 
the category of race and the supposed differences that exist between the races and the inherent abilities, 
attributes, and defects that supposedly exist between different races. 
22
 Ibid., 404. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Dean, 28. For examples  of this in the form of individual articles see Burgess, supra note 11; Teemu Ruskola 
supra note 11; Kathrine Franke supra note 11. 
26
 Ibid., 27. 
27
 Ibid., 28. 
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thought that ask: Who rules? What is the source of that rule? What is the basis of its 
legitimacy?”28 Unfortunately, scholars relying on the works of Foucault do not fully 
acknowledge the disproportionate power that institutions hold in comparison to individuals. 
They get lost in the world of micro-forces that shaped our lives. It makes sense to employ a 
broader analysis that focuses on a realistic appraisal of the place of institutions and their 
effect on the lives of individuals. Michel Foucault’s theory of governmentality helps to 
resolve this issue by providing a framework that can be used to analyze these institutions and 
their behaviors both on a micro and a macro-scale. Burgess’s analysis focuses on the specific 
actions of the justices. The biggest weakness of this argument, however, is that it actually 
takes the actions of the Court at face value. It does not try interpreting the reasons why the 
Court has had a reversal of thought from Bowers to Lawrence. This analysis doesn’t fully 
utilize Foucault’s later theorizing and consequently misses the point that the Court is not 
merely acting out of ideological preferences. Instead, it is acting on the logic of 
governmentality and developing governing practices that attempt to govern society in the 
most efficient manner possible. 
Second, I will discuss scholarship from the law and literature movement. Scholars 
from the law and literature movement have also looked at the way in which the Supreme 
Court has affected the lives of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) people. 
These scholars have focused mostly on the narratives of LGBT people and legal history as 
constructed in the Court’s opinions. As James Boyd White argues: 
                                                          
28
 Ibid., 29. 
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The judicial opinion is a claim of meaning: it describes the case, telling its story in a 
particular way; it explains or justifies the result; and in the process it connects the 
case with earlier cases, the particular facts with more general concerns. It translates 
the experience of the parties, and the languages in which they naturally speak of it, 
into the language of the law, which connects cases across time and space; and it 
translates the texts of the law…into the terms defined by the present case.29 
It is these factors that make it important to study the way in which the Court tells the story of 
the participants of cases. The way in which the Court characterizes these individuals can 
reveal the explicit and implicit feelings of the Court towards these actors. 
Law and literature scholars, such as Glenda Conway and Timothy Lin, have focused 
on voice and narratives in judicial decisions.
30
 Likewise, Karen Tracey’s work has looked at 
the way that judges in the New York legal system treated LGBT people as actors before the 
courts.
31
 Tracey shows that the way in which judges have positively or negatively perceived 
LGBT plaintiffs and defendants, plays a role in how judicial outcomes are decided. This 
literary scholarship has drawn on the work of linguists such as Jorg Bergman to better 
understand the structure of arguments within legal texts.
 32
 Bergmann argues that modern 
institutions such as the courts have more and more been called on to resolve issues that are of 
                                                          
29
 James Boyd White, 1367. 
30
 Glenda Conway, “Judging the Voices of Judicial Law,” Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 4, 
no. 1 (1999): 159-172; Glenda Conway, “Inevitable Reconstructions: Voice and Ideology in Two Landmark 
U.S. Supreme Court Opinions,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 6, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 487-508; Timothy E. Lin, 
“Social Norms and Judicial Decisionmaking: Examining the Role of Narratives in Same-Sex Adoption Cases,” 
Columbia Law Review 99 (1999): 739-794; Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, “Telling Stories Out of School: 
An Essay on Legal Narratives,” Stanford Law Review 45 (1993): 807-809. 
31
 Karen Tracy, “How Questioning Constructs Judge Identities: Oral Argument about Same-Sex Marriage,” 
Discourse Studies 11, no. 2 (2009): 199-221. 
32
 Jorg R. Bergman, “Introduction: Morality in Discourse,” Research on Language and Social Interaction 31, 
no. 3&4 (1998): 279-294. 
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a moral nature.  Bergman states that they “work within institutions that function according to 
‘rational’ models and criteria, and they therefore are officially constrained to ‘demoralize’ 
issues couching them in terms of scientific or bureaucratic rationality. Professionals are 
trained to take a ‘neutralistic’ stance with respect to the problems they deal with.”33  In 
contrast to this supposed objective analysis, Bergman argues that the actual activities of these 
institutions are grounded in strong moralizing frameworks due to the modern bureaucratic 
necessity of assessing people and determining their relation to bureaucratic norms and 
standards.
34
 
The professionals that comprise the legal system realize that this occurs in their 
discipline. Specifically, Judge Patricia Wald writes, “the conventional wisdom is that the 
’Facts‘ portion of an appellate opinion merely recites neutral, predetermined ’facts‘ found by 
the lower court…Yet nothing could be farther from the truth. When an appellate judge sits 
down to write up a case, she knows how the case will come out and she consciously relates a 
‘story’ that will convince the reader it has come out right. In the last century, the fact-
‘spinning’ function of opinions has become much more important…[Because] there is only 
one account of the ‘facts.’”35 This is a departure from how 19th century Court opinions were 
structured. During the 1800s both parties’ arguments were laid out in detail.36 It shows the 
historically specific nature of institutional norms and their openness to change. Judge Wald 
continues: 
                                                          
33
 Bergman, 291. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Patricia M. Wald, “The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writing,” University of 
Chicago Law Review, vol. 6 (1995): 1367-1368. 
36
 Ibid., 1386. 
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This is not just a matter of being selective about which facts to emphasize (or even to 
mention), but also a matter of characterization; the facts can—and indeed must—be 
retold to cast a party as an innocent victim or an undeserving malefactor, to tow the 
storyline into the safe harbor of whatever principles of law the author thinks should 
control the case.
37
 
Conway connects with this view; arguing that the justices’ reconstruction of individuals and 
events, in cases presented to them, reflect the author’s view of them.38 The entire legal 
system is then influenced by a particular justice’s, or group of justices’, view because of the 
binding and far reaching nature of precedents.
39
 Through the lens of the majority opinion in 
Bowers, authored by Justice White, the petitioner Michael Hardwick becomes 
unsympathetic, threatening, and undeserving of constitutional protections because his 
lifestyle threatens American traditions and values.
40
 This brings to light another insight of 
literary studies: the study of the importance of extreme case formations.
41
 Extreme case 
formations are those utterances that an author uses to convey the reasonableness of their 
argument in adversarial situations.
42
 Extreme case formations are those sentence 
constructions used to maximize the legitimacy of a claim being made. Pomerantz points to a 
number of examples of this such as, “‘brand new’;  ‘completely innocent’; ‘he was driving 
perfectly’…”43 These are words added to a description that go above and beyond what is 
needed to be said in order to remove all doubt about the argument or point that the speaker is 
                                                          
37
 Ibid., 1386. 
38
 Conway, “Judging,” 166; Conway, ““Reconstructions,” 488. 
39
 Conway, “Reconstructions,” 489. 
40
 Ibid., 489-490. 
41
 Tracy, 214; Pomerantz, 219-220. 
42
 Pomerantz, 222. 
43
 Ibid., 219. 
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trying to make. There are many examples of state courts, appellate courts, and the Supreme 
Court using extreme case formations when arguing against gay rights.
44
 An example of this 
can be seen in Justice White’s argument that only those rights “deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition” are eligible for heightened constitutional protections.45 The key part of 
this construction is the phrase, “deeply rooted,” because this reveals White’s belief that 
sexual matters, outside of procreation and family rearing, are not a legitimate part of 
American culture or history and thus beyond any state protections. From this standpoint, 
White’s denial of Hardwick’s claims to the contrary can be seen as legitimate and reasonable. 
While this literary take on Court scholarship is useful in understanding how the Court 
has constructed the narratives and voices of people within the legal system, there are still 
some gaps in this line of thinking. What this scholarship ignores is what has motivated the 
Court to reach the conclusions that it did. Conway claims that “arguments justifying Court 
decisions are not grounded exclusively in readings and interpretations of external ‘facts’ such 
as precedents and the Constitution, but also in internal fictionalizations of the involved 
principles.”46 What this paper provides is an alternative framework for explaining the logic of 
the Supreme Court, which in turn provides an explanation as to why the Court came to a 
particular conclusion in each case.  
Third, I will review literature from scholars, mostly within the legal profession itself, 
that root their analyses in the specific legalistic mechanisms that operate within the Supreme 
Court’s decisions. These scholars look at the specific interpretations of the Constitution and 
laws the Supreme Court has relied upon to make decisions. This sort of scholarship is most 
                                                          
44
 Tracy, 214; Conway, “Reconstructions,” 501.  
45
 Bowers, 191-192. 
46
 Conway, “Reconstructions,” 491-492. 
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heavily represented in law journals, but can also be found in social science journals. Authors 
such as Bluestone, et al., have focused on the specific legal mechanisms that have driven 
Supreme Court decision making in gay rights cases.
47
 “Loving Lawrence” discusses the 
similarities and differences between Loving v. Virginia and Lawrence v. Texas, two landmark 
Supreme Court cases dealing with the state’s recognition of various intimate partnerships. In 
Loving, the Supreme Court held that anti-miscegenation laws which were prevalent in the 
South and prevented mixed race couples from marrying were unconstitutional. The Lawrence 
Court provided some recognition of same-sex couples by holding that sodomy laws were 
likewise unconstitutional.
48
 The main focus of this literature is how the Supreme Court 
comes to justify its decisions. The emphasis of this research understands the legal logic that 
underpins these decisions and what they mean for future legal cases. This involves examining 
the text of the Constitution, previous cases with similar circumstances and outcomes, and 
how the justices have previously viewed the legal mechanisms at play in a given case. 
While I share much of the same concerns and concepts as scholars in legal research, 
such as Kathrine Franke and Teemu Ruskola, what differentiates their scholarship from mine 
is their focus. Legal scholars, including those coming from the school of queer theory, focus 
                                                          
47
 These authors come at the study of the Court from the traditions laid out in laws schools and study the Court 
in this fashion. Gloria Bluestone, “Going to the Chapel and We’re Going to Get Married; But Will the State 
Recognize the Marriage? The Constitutionality of State Marriage Laws After Lawrence v. Texas,” Texas 
Journal on Civil Liberties & Civil Rights 10, no. 2 (2005): 189-221; Pamela S. Karlan, “Foreword: Loving 
Lawrence,” Michigan Law Review 102 (2003-2004): 1447-1463; Susan Ayres, “Coming Out: Decision-Making 
in State and Federal Sodomy Cases,” Albany Law Review 62 (1998): 355-402; R. A. Lenhardt, “Beyond 
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on the specific legal mechanism at work within a text to try and understand their meaning. 
Franke, for example, examines what the concept of “liberty” and “freedom” mean to Justice 
Kennedy in Lawrence, and how those concepts are applied.
49
 I, on the other hand, am not 
interested in the specific legal mechanism at work within these decisions. While I 
acknowledge that they play a part in constructing the narratives and choices laid in these 
decisions. The project that I am embarking on is an attempt to try to understand what 
motivates the Court to act in the broadest sense possible. To determine what logic lies at the 
heart of the Court as a state institution in the context of modern world. And pull back the 
curtain and look at the gear and cogs that moves the Court. This is where Foucault’s concept 
of governmentality comes in. They are studying the mechanics of the law where as I am 
studying power and the Court. Therefore, governmentality lies at the heart of this study 
because it is the tool I use to understand the Court as a state power in modern society. The 
greatest weakness of this approach is that it fails to identify and examine the larger rationale 
that has driven the Court and that is expressed through its language. It is true that the Court’s 
legal interpretations and arguments will have the most impact on the law and the nation as a 
whole. However, the Court’s stance, tone, and rhetoric when dealing with an issue surely 
have a broader ideological impact as well. This is partly due to the perceived finality of the 
decisions made by the Supreme Court. The Court creates precedents that impact all lower 
courts and even lawmakers themselves. It often takes years or even decades for a decision to 
be overturned by a future Supreme Court. In the interim, the previous ruling of the Court has 
had a substantial legal, political, and social impact. The Court also possesses a great deal of 
moral authority. For example, Chief Justice Warren’s psychological analysis of African-
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American children in Brown v. Board of Education has had a lasting impact on the way in 
which race relations have been discussed over the last sixty years. Legal scholars continue to 
analyze his argument that the lack of access to equal education for African-Americans is 
detrimental to their mental and social development.
50
 The great impact of Chief Justice 
Warren’s reasoning here is important to study, because it goes beyond a mere legal 
explanation and shows how the Supreme Court views African-Americans as a group. The 
impact of the Court’s decision is seen as having such a far reaching political, legal, and social 
impact that it is essential to study the whole of these Court documents and parse out their 
broader implications rather than a limited mechanistic analysis. 
Uniquely, my approach will also utilize Foucault’s theory of governmentality. A 
Foucauldian analysis consists of an examination of the three parts of an institution. The first 
and driving force of an institution is its rationality of government: the way an institution 
understands its tasks, its goals, and the things that it has set out to understand and manage.
51
 
Through this understanding, an institution develops knowledge and truth of its subjects and 
the subject’s place within the workings of government. Second, institutions develop 
programs of government to carry out these rationalities and plans to carry out these tasks. 
Third, in carrying out these programs, institutions deploy mechanisms, instruments, 
procedures, and techniques used to achieve the desired results – what Foucault calls 
technologies of government.
52
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Other groups of scholars, such as queer theorists, have consciously adopted a 
Foucauldian understanding while mainstream legal studies have unconsciously devoted their 
energies to understanding the technologies of government. Precisely, they have focused on 
the specific legal mechanisms at play within gay rights decisions and what the justices have 
had to say about these technologies these cases and past precedent. The aim of this paper is to 
study the rationalities of government that inform the decision making of the Supreme Court 
and the traces of these rationalities that remain hidden within their texts.
53
 This is important 
because of the lack of scholarship devoted to governmentalization of the judicial system.
54
 
This study will focus on the components of this new rationality of government: security, 
territory, and population. It is these three components of modern government that guide 
government decision-making, although each institution has interpreted them differently. 
Consequently, the study of this underlying ideology is paramount to understanding the 
functioning of the modern societies. 
Methodology: Governmentality as a Guiding Principle to Modern Government 
Analytics of Government 
In this next section, I chart out the framework for my thinking on the Supreme Court 
which is an analytics of government. My mode of analysis in answering these essential 
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questions relies on the work of French philosopher Michel Foucault and his concept of 
governmentality. Governmentality is the conduct of conduct. This means that 
governmentality is interested in molding the ways in which people conduct their lives: what 
they eat, what they think, how they perceive others, and how others perceive them. Directly, 
the government enforces this through law and the operation of government agencies. 
Indirectly, it disseminates its perception of various peoples through the enforcement of 
policy. Governmentality also involves the self-corrective behavior of individuals themselves 
and the people that they interact with through broader cultural trends. This is true of any 
division of government that governs what people do or how they identify themselves, such as 
a judicial body like the Supreme Court. This paper draws upon a Foucauldian analysis to 
understand the ways in which government institutions organize themselves, develop 
understandings of people, and go about operating on the larger society. At the center of the 
study of governmental practice is the need to analyze regimes of practices. Regimes of 
practices are historically constituted ways of doing things. Social, moral, cultural, political 
and economic practices operate based on the rules now in place, but they change over time as 
new ways of doing things are thought up and adopted by society at large. 
Institutions study these regimes of practices to better understand what is going on 
around them as well as to better adapt their institution to the governance of the population 
and the state. They do this by collecting statistical data, reviewing scholarly studies, and 
looking back at historical examples. Gilles Deleuze tells us that there are four dimensions to 
the study of regimes of practices: the field of visibility, the technical aspect of government, 
the approach to government as a rational and thoughtful activity, and the formation of 
identities. The first aspect, the field of visibility, regards what is the object of study by the 
 19 
 
particular institution. In these instances, the Supreme Court’s object of study is sexual 
orientation, specifically gays as a group of people.
55
  
 The second aspect of regimes of practices is the technical aspect of government. This 
relates to what means, mechanisms, procedures, instruments, tactics, techniques, 
technologies, and vocabularies the Court uses to constitute it and how it accomplishes its 
goals. This is where a study of judicial mechanisms will come in. The way in which the 
Court interacts with lower courts and briefs and how their interpretation of these documents 
shapes their decisions. This deals with what aspects of these cases the lower courts have 
decided to pay attention to, what facts they look at and accept, and the way in which the 
Supreme Court has not challenged the lack of presentation of facts by lower courts. This also 
deals with which briefs the Supreme Court’s decisions cite and how they interpret them and 
which briefs are left out of the Court’s opinions. 
The third aspect will be the approach to government as a rational and thoughtful 
activity. We will need to ask a series of questions about how the Court operates and what 
rationality guides its thinking: What knowledge, expertise, strategies, and means of 
calculation or rationality are employed in the practices of governing? How these areas seek to 
transform practices. How their logic gives rise to specific forms of truth. How these forms of 
thought seek to make specific objects governable. The next goal for government then 
becomes ensuring that these objects of study internalize the practices and forms of truth. 
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The final aspect of regimes of practices is the formation of identities. Government is 
concerned about the categories of people that exist and with the types of people they would 
like to create.
56
 Institutions work to create environments, conditions, rules, and practices that 
foster specific ways of thinking about an object, subject, or action. This is not to say that 
these institutions can force people to self-identify with the personal and social traits that best 
suit the needs of good government. Instead, these institutions are “successful to the extent 
that these agents come to experience themselves through such capacities (e.g. of rational 
decision-making), qualities (e.g. as having a sexuality) and statuses (e.g. as being an active 
citizen).”57 Institutions act through these everyday environments to promote regulatory 
norms that govern individuals’ behavior both explicitly, through rules, directives, and the 
correction of others’ behavior, as well as implicitly through self-governance, the acceptance 
of these ways of thinking and self-correction of thoughts and actions. In the end, I’m trying 
to show that the Supreme Court’s underlying logic is the logic of governmentality, and thus 
understanding governmental rationality can explain the Court’s decisions in Bowers, Romer, 
and Lawrence. 
Discourse Analysis 
Next, Foucault’s notion of discourse analysis also plays a role in my thinking and this 
will be elaborated in this section. The analysis of discourse was important for Foucault 
because he understood “discourse as actively constituting or constructing society on various 
dimensions: discourse constitutes the objects of knowledge social subjects and forms of 
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‘self’, social relationships, and conceptual frameworks.”58 In order to understand how the 
world around us operates, it is necessary to delve into the texts that constitute institutions, 
places of power, and the elements of everyday life. 
Foucault’s insights into discourse are important for a number of reasons: discourse 
constitutes social objects, he brings to the fore the intertextuality of discourses, the discursive 
nature of biopower, the political nature of discourse through power struggles that occur 
through it, and the importance that discursive practices play in social change.
59
 For Foucault, 
a discursive formation consists of “‘rules of formation’ for the particular set of statements 
which belong to it, and more specifically rules for the formation of objects…‘enumerative 
modalities’ and ‘subject positions’…‘concepts’…[and] strategies.”60 These elements of a 
discursive formation work together and form cohesive texts that layout ideas in the modern 
world. 
The first element of a discursive formation is the object of the discourse. According 
to Foucault, “objects” of discourse means objects of knowledge, the component parts of 
various disciplines, sciences, or areas of interest that are taken as an object of study.
61
 
Foucault views “discourse as constitutive – as contributing to the production, transformation, 
and reproduction of the objects [and subjects]…of social life.”62 Discourse plays an active 
role in the construction of our reality; it helps to give meaning to the social and physical 
world around us and our daily interactions with each other as people. Discourse is not a 
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passive reflection of reality that shines back at us.
63
  Objects are constituted in reference to 
the text at hand and to outside texts. This means that objects of study have definitions 
inherent in a given text, but also possess other meanings and aspects that come from other 
texts that have described the object at hand. In the end, one cannot escape discourse of texts 
because language is bound up in them. The interplay between intra-discursive, inter-
discursive, and non-discursive formations and practices all play a part in constraining and 
structuring arguments, what constitutes an object, and what can be said about an object.
64
 
The second element of a discursive formation is its enumerative modalities. Norman 
Fairclough defines enumerative modalities as those “types of discursive activity such as 
describing, forming hypotheses, formulating regulations, teaching…each of which has its 
own associated subject positions.”65 These enumerative modalities are historically contingent 
and so the study of the social conditions from which they emerge is important.
66
 This means 
that a judge “is constituted through a configuration of enunciative modalities and subject 
positions which is held in place by the current rules of [judicial] discourse.”67 By taking up 
Foucault’s position, it is possible to see that discourse plays a pivotal role in the construction 
of social subjects. People do not merely use language that expresses elements of their social 
identity (gender, class, race, and sexual orientation); rather the language we use creates and 
reinforces the identities that  we possess by perpetuating the elements of a social subject 
through discourse. 
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The third element of discursive formations is the formation of concepts. Concepts are 
the “battery of categories, elements and types which a discipline uses as an apparatus for 
treating its field of interest.” 68  These concepts help to form intra-discursive relationships 
within a text, the structural arrangement of arguments, descriptions, and evidence. In 
addition, they form the inter-discursive relationships between different texts, belonging to 
“‘fields of presence,’ ‘concomitance,’ or ‘memory.’”69 Foucault defines a field of presence as 
those statements that are taken from outside of the text, but incorporate into its discourse 
what are considered to be true, involve description, use sound reasoning, or have essential 
assumptions that are analyzed explicitly or implicitly.
70
 Foucault places, “emphasis on the 
interdependency of the discourse practices of a society or institution: texts always draw upon 
and transform other contemporary and historically prior texts.”71 Texts play off one another 
both implicitly and explicitly as when an author argues a point. It is within this context that 
concepts and statements are shaped. The field of concomitance consists of statements that 
concern widely varying objects of study and belong to dissimilar types of discourse but are 
active in the statements being studied in the current text because they serve to illustrate a 
general principle, model, or serve as a higher authority on a relevant portion of the discourse. 
For example, one could bring a discourse on cooking into a discourse of computer science 
because of some relevant theoretical link between the two.
72
 Finally, Foucault defines the 
field of memory as those “statements that are no longer accepted or discussed, and which 
consequently no longer define either a body of truth or a domain of validity, but in relation to 
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which relations of filiation, genesis, transformation, continuity, and historical discontinuity 
can be established.”73 These are memories of old theories and ways of doing things that are 
now considered wrong and outdated but still serve a useful purpose for making a point in the 
current discourse. In the context of the modern Supreme Court, for example, it would be 
appropriate in a discussion of Plessy v. Furgesson to make correlations to slavery, or other 
legal rulings, interpretations, or thinking that plays some illustrative role in the current 
discourse. 
Foucault is interested in the contextual nature of texts. Likewise, Fairclough states 
that “discourse analysis is concerned…with specifying socio-historically variable ‘discursive 
formations’…systems of rules which make it possible for certain statements but not others to 
occur at particular times, places and institutional locations.”74 For Foucault, there are two 
types of context that govern the specificity of statements and texts: situational context and 
verbal context. Situational context is the socio-historical situation or period that a text finds 
itself in.
75
 Verbal context is a statement’s position in relation to the other statements in a text 
that precedes it and follows it. The relationship between statements and their context is not 
transparent.
76
 How it is interpreted varies from one discursive formation to another. 
The final element of a discursive formation is the formation of strategies. Foucault 
defines strategies as theories, themes, and explanations that shape the argument of a 
discourse.
77
 However, the world in which a discourse exists places constraints on the 
strategies that an author uses in any particular discourse. While there are certainly inter-
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discursive constraints on the formation of different lines of thought, here Foucault brings into 
the discussion non-discursive constraints for the first time. For an example of non-discursive 
constraints, Foucault points to the myriad array of non-discursive practices intrinsic to the 
workings of the economy that help mold the boundaries of what is conceivable within 
economic discourses.
78
 These rules for the formation of strategies govern what action can and 
will be actualized.
79
 At the same time, discourse continues to play a pivotal role in 
determining the constraints on non-discursive practices. Discourse, on the whole, is able to 
overcome these constraints to play a dominant role in determining the realm of possibility for 
both discursive and non-discursive practices.
80
 To illustrate this point, Foucault first points to 
the function of discourse in a field of non-discursive practices.
81
 He cites the function of 
economic discourse in the practices of emergent capitalism as an example of the power of 
discourse to shape the future discursive and non-discursive norms and practices. Secondly, 
Foucault points out the process of appropriation of discourse were the right to speak, ability 
to understand, the right to draw upon the corpus of already formulated statements, and to use 
these statements in decisions of institutions is unequally distributed between social groups.
82
 
This means that dominant forces within the social system are able to construct arguments and 
narratives that have a profound impact on everyday social practices and the realm of possible 
discourse on just about any topic. Finally, Foucault points out “the possible positions of 
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desire in relation to discourse: discourse may in fact be the place for a phantasmatic 
representation, an element of symbolization, a form of the forbidden, an instrument of 
derived satisfaction.”83 All of these elements relate to the “materiality” of statements.84 By 
this, Foucault means the status or weight of discourse in relation to a particular institution. 
All of this is relevant to actors who appear before the Supreme Court, the justices 
themselves, and the broader public who are all shaped by how discourses are produced and 
interpreted. 
Explaining Governmentality More Broadly 
Finally, in this section I give a brief overview of Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality so that the reader will be familiar with some of the terms and ideas I use to 
develop my argument. The study of governmental rationality is important to the present 
study, because a thorough understanding of the government’s reasoning process can 
illuminate why the state and its institutions adopt a policy. In his lectures, Foucault lays out 
the three fundamental components of this new mode of power: governmentality, the 
apparatus of security, and population. Governmentality produces knowledge through 
political, economic, and the societal forces behind the market and trade. Theoreticians of 
governmentality understood these social forces as the way in which people would act without 
social constraints placed on them by the state. They focused on how people interact with each 
other in their daily social and economic interactions.
85
 The emphasis on the processes of civil 
society reduced the importance of judicial and disciplinary power, because both act upon the 
population in a heavy handed way. Disciplinarity and juridical mechanisms do not fully align 
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with the social processes of human life as they consist of a priori rules and regulations 
imposed from outside on a population. They remain part of the modern state, however, 
because they served to control the population within their assigned spheres of influence and 
because they can be refined by applying the knowledge gained from studying the societal 
workings of a population. Foucault’s concept of governmentality is an attempt to explain 
why the government operates the way it does in the modern era. What governmentality 
represents is the state’s attempt to govern people’s conduct both through direct interventions 
and through convincing people to govern themselves. Governmentality is about applying 
rationality and thought to the act of governing. The acts in this way because the state has a 
responsibility to foster and protect its society, therefore, the state must take an active role in 
managing a nation’s population in ways that will best promote the wellbeing of society.86 So 
the study of populations and how to manage them lies at the center of governmentality’s 
reasoning because its end goal is the welfare of the population. Governmentality goes about 
this study of a population by both totalizing and individualizing its members.
87
 The state 
must study the population as a whole through statics on a wide array of topics: birth rates, 
death rates, diseases, income, employment figures, and so forth. The state however, also 
analyses individuals through public education, census data, tax information, and any one of 
the hundreds of forms and exams present within the state bureaucracy. Foucault states that 
this is because “the means that the government uses to attain these ends are themselves 
immanent in the population.”88 Since governmentality is the “conduct of conduct” this means 
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that the best solutions to managing the interests of a population are through self-
governance.
89
 When people take it upon themselves to govern their own behavior it benefits 
the state. This is because it takes fewer resources to achieve desired results. This can lead to 
less resistance because the population takes it upon itself to abide by social norms. This 
means that the state will look at all forms of conduct in order to try to determine the best way 
of convincing people to manage their own behavior. This includes specific institutions, such 
as the law and the courts. 
The law is created in order to control how people act. The Court explicitly controls 
people’s behavior by deeming certain practices illegal, how the Court implicitly controls 
people’s behavior through the way in which it frames its arguments in Bowers, Romer, and 
Lawrence. The goal will be to show how the Court has used the law to respond to challenges 
to accepted social behaviors over time. 
Governmentality has a number of features that distinguish it from the concept of 
sovereign power which had been the dominant modality of power during the Middle Ages. 
Governmentality uses the techniques of security, statistics, to study and manipulate the 
development of society. The target of power is not a territory, which had been the target in 
the age of sovereignty; instead the target is the entire population of the state. Under 
governmentality strengthening the state has become an end unto itself. The goal of the state 
under this regime is to construct a government that can manage and produce a healthy and 
prosperous population.
90
 People matter to the state in so much as the population is a 
reflection of the character of the state. If the population is plentiful and productive, it can be 
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said that the state is strong; and if the population is small and unproductive, it can be said that 
the state is weak.
91
 This is where the Foucault’s notion of biopolitics emerges.92 The state is 
interested in the population as “a set of coexisting living beings with particular biological and 
pathological features, and which as such falls under specific forms of knowledge and 
technique.”93 The state has a need to understand the population and how it self-organizes and 
so it fosters institutions designed to study the population. This includes institutions that study 
things such as public hygiene, sociology, criminology, and political science. The state then 
uses the knowledge gathered by these institutions to develop techniques for government to 
govern the population. This is the focus of biopolitics as the merger of natural biological 
processes with the political practices of the state.  
Until the emergence of governmentality, how well a sovereign ruled was judged on 
how closely he managed the affairs of state – like that of the family with the sovereign as 
head of the household.
94
 The family remains important in this scheme because it has long 
been associated with the relations of power and knowledge.
95
 However, under 
governmentality, the family emerges as an instrument of government rather than a model of 
government.
96
 Foucault makes this clear when he states that, “whenever information is 
required concerning the population (sexual behavior, demography, and consumption), it has 
to be obtained through the family.”97 How the law and the courts constrain or mold morality 
and sexuality, in terms of how it affects the family, emerges as an important field of study. 
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This is not because of the specific prohibitions laid out in the law, but because it serves as 
window into the broader message that the government is sending. The state’s message being: 
who it favors, what practices it favors, and what ends the government is trying to promote.  
The purpose of the present paper is to explore the emergence of governmentality and 
its features in more detail, because governmentality represents the ruling form of power and 
guiding ideology of governments in the modern era. The ideological emphasis on society as a 
whole and not interfering dramatically with the systems of civil society has even had, I will 
argue, an impact on the legal system and how courts function in the modern era. The 
differing outcomes of Bowers, Romer, and Lawrence can serve as a model for how judicial 
functions work in the modern state and what relationships it perceives as having a place in 
civil society. 
The state’s interest in examining and understanding all of the dimensions of a 
population points to the reason why the Supreme Court chose to take up these cases in the 
first place. Sexuality and the family remain important sites of contestation between the state 
and other social groups within society, because it represents the most basic social formation 
in modern society.
98
 The family teaches new generations how to act as responsible, 
productive members of society, and passes on society’s norms and ideals regarding topics 
such as religion, family matters, health, and morality.
99
 The goal of governmentality is the 
stability of the system as a whole. As new problems emerge, the government responds by 
managing the challenge these problems pose. Acting from this logic, the Court acted to shape 
the perception of alternate sexualities and social groupings. Over time, the Court has 
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responded the LGBT community’s demand for more rights in several different ways as the 
social terrain around them has changed. 
The rationality of government does not respect the judicial system in the same way 
that sovereignty has.
100
 Foucault gives the coup d’état as an example of a time which raison 
d’état ignores the law in order to preserve the state. The sacredness of the rule of law (God’s 
laws, natural laws, and man’s laws) can be shed in times of crisis.101 This same disregard for 
law exists not only in the early modern police state, but is also a characteristic of the modern 
state. One only has to look at the working of the United States government in the post 
September 11th period where even American citizens have been targeted for assassination 
without any charges being brought against them.
102
 This opens up the possibility that 
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traditions, such as legal precedents and due process, hold less sway than is espoused by 
judges. 
In an earlier epoch, under the rule of sovereignty, justice acted as a means of 
deterrence and punishment. Governmentality has altered the legal system so that its primary 
aim is no longer deterrence; instead it is meant to be a transformative institution that can 
remold individuals into productive members of society. One of the things that distinguish 
governmental rationality from other forms of social control, is its insistence that technologies 
of power be applied not according to some abstract model or formula, but according to the 
way that society really functions. The state possesses an incomplete knowledge of the 
subjects it tries to control and this exposes the potential weakness of the state.
103
 Working 
from this mindset, the government tries to avoid endeavors that would radically alter the way 
in which society functions.
104
 This leads to skepticism of attempts at reforming governmental 
or social relations.
105
 Normalization is an important tool in governmentality’s arsenal. It is 
through this mechanism that institutions try to mold individuals and populations. 
Normalization also works on people to get them to internalize sets of acceptable behavior 
that ensure the smoother functioning of the larger society. However, this does not mean that a 
concerted effort to resist power cannot change how institutions perceive social groups and act 
upon them. 
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Bowers v. Hardwick – Gays and Lesbians as Criminal Others 
This section will track how the Court dealt with gay and lesbian identity in the 
Bowers decision. First, I will chart out the history behind the Bowers case to provide some 
context. Second, I will analyze the Bowers decision in order to survey governmental 
rationality’s place in it.  Finally, I’ll discuss identity construction in Bowers and how the 
logic of governmentality worked to create a productive identity for gays and lesbians, 
paradoxically, as a “criminal other” in the eyes of the state. 
The History of Bowers 
First I will look at the history of Bowers. The history of Bowers v. Hardwick begins in 
July 1982.
106
 Michael Hardwick was a twenty-eight year old bartender at a local gay bar in 
Atlanta. On the morning of July 5th Hardwick was issued a citation for carrying an open 
bottle in from a bar called the Cove. He was helping friends remodel the bar. However, 
Hardwick missed his Court date because the citing officer, Keith Torick, had written the 
wrong date on the top of the ticket.
107
 When Hardwick appeared at the court house, on the 
day Officer Torick had written down, he found out that he had missed his real court day. 
Hardwick then paid the fine. In the meantime, a warrant for his arrest, stemming from his 
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missed court date, had been issued to Officer Torick. On the morning of August 3, Officer 
Torick was let into Hardwick’s apartment by a guest who had been asleep on the living room 
couch. Officer Torick then entered the apartment and went to Hardwick’s bedroom and 
discovered Hardwick and another man engaged in mutual oral sex. At this point, Officer 
Torick announced himself and arrested both men for engaging in sodomy after Hardwick 
protested that the officer had no right to be in his home. Later, Officer Torick would discover 
that the warrant had expired three weeks before the time of the arrest because Hardwick had 
paid the fine. The expired warrant, the questionable manner in which Officer Torick entered 
the apartment, previous citizen complaints against Officer Torick, and his own views on the 
constitutionality of sodomy laws led District Attorney Lewis Slaton to throw out the sodomy 
charges. 
Undeterred by this turn of events, Hardwick’s lawyers pressed on with a complaint to 
the federal district court. Hardwick challenged the Georgia statute, on the grounds that it 
violated the Constitution’s Due Process Clause. A married couple, friends of Hardwick, also 
joined the case as John and Mary Doe because they wished to remain anonymous. John and 
Mary Doe claimed that Hardwick’s arrest had a chilling effect on their own private intimate 
life and that their fear of imminent arrest had prevented them from engaging in the 
proscribed acts because the Georgia statute made it a crime for any person to engage in 
sodomy.
108
 However, the federal district court dismissed the case based on failure to state a 
claim.
109
 Hardwick appealed the dismissal to the 11
th
 Circuit Court of Appeals. The court 
agreed with Hardwick on the privacy issue. It also concluded that since Hardwick had been 
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arrested he had standing to bring the case. On the other hand, the court ruled that John and 
Mary Doe did not have standing. After the trial Georgia State Attorney General Michael 
Bowers appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. 
 According to internal Supreme Court documents the Court decided review the 
Bowers case for a number of reasons. First, there were discrepancies between the federal 
courts as to how they were ruling in these cases.
110
 Secondly, both the liberal and 
conservative sides of the Court thought that they might be able to decide the sodomy issue in 
their favor.
111
 However, when the liberal justices learned of Justice Powell’s ambivalence on 
the issue they tried unsuccessfully to stop the Court from hearing the Bowers case, primarily 
due to Justice Powell being a key swing vote in the matter.
112
 Oral arguments were heard 
March 31, 1986. In a five to four decision, the Court reversed the 11
th
 Circuit Court of 
Appeals. The Court majority narrowed the question to whether homosexuals had a 
constitutional right to engage in sodomy.
113
 They answered no. The Georgia statute 
criminalized all forms of sodomy between all persons, regardless of gender or sexual 
orientation. Justice White, writing for the majority, ruled that the appellate court had ruled 
incorrectly in finding a constitutional right to privacy in regards to gay conduct, because “no 
connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual 
activity on the other has been demonstrated.”114  Justice White found no connection between 
Hardwick’s actions and the Court’s earlier cases that involved contraception, child care, 
marriage, and other family matters. Justice White failed to see that the Court’s earlier 
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decisions granting heterosexuals more freedom to control their own intimate lives could also 
be applied to people with other sexual orientations as well. The Court’s decision to uphold 
the Georgia statute meant that wherever sodomy laws existed, people would remain 
vulnerable to prosecution whether or not the sexual activity was between consenting adults. 
However, ten years after its decision in Bowers, the Court would begin to reconsider its 
stance on gay rights. 
A Discussion of the Logic of Governmentality in the Bowers Decision 
Next, I will discuss the logic of governmentality as it works in the Bowers decision. 
Followed by why the Court constructed gays a criminal other in the Bowers decision. 
Although the outcome of Bowers v. Hardwick was negative for the gay and lesbian 
community, the case remains important as the first time the Supreme Court had issued an 
opinion on the rights of gays and lesbians. The main theme of Justice White’s majority 
opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick was that homosexuals are a criminal element within the 
United States and therefore deserve no right to practice private, consensual sodomy.
115
 
Through a review of local and state laws, going as far back as the pre-revolutionary colonial 
period, Justice White found that every state had an anti-sodomy statute until the 1960s. 
Furthermore, a strict reading of the Constitution found no mention of a right to engage in 
sodomy, so Justice White has no qualms with upholding the right of states to enact anti-
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sodomy statutes. Although Justice White’s reasoning seems straightforward, we can ask why 
he did not use a more nuanced reading of the Constitution.
116
 We can see more expansive 
readings of the Constitution in earlier cases that involve intimate relationships and medical 
procedures, such as Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), Loving v. Texas (1967), Eisenstadt v. 
Baird (1972), and Roe v. Wade (1973).
117
 Why did the majority refused to look at the fact 
that the Georgia statue prohibited not just gay sodomy but straight sodomy as well? Why did 
Justice White’s argument construct the identity of gays? These are important questions 
because their answers illuminate the way towards understanding the workings of 
governmental rationality within the Supreme Court. 
The language in Supreme Court opinions plays a key role in determining how the 
Justices view an issue. Justice White’s language in the opinion reveals how the Court viewed 
gays. Justice White identifies Hardwick by name in the first sentence of his opinion. 
However, White goes on to identify Hardwick as the “respondent” for the remainder of the 
opinion.
118
 Judicial opinions often omit the name of the parties in cases.
119
 This may stem 
from the Court’s aim to articulate the broader principles at work within a case. Here the 
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Court downplays the importance of the individuals in the case. Still, this practice plays an 
important role in how the case is constructed and subsequently read. This is an important 
choice by the Court, because it dehumanizes Hardwick, and by extension all other gay 
people, for the purpose of continuing to criminalize “homosexual” activity. 
We can see that the Court has specific meanings for the words that it uses to describe 
heterosexuals, homosexuals, and the social relations that relate to them. Heterosexuals are 
people who come together with someone of the opposite sex, get bound up in marriage, start 
a family, and have children.
120
 When Justice White compares these criteria to homosexuals 
and concludes that they are not like heterosexuals at all. Next, Justice White examines the 
precedents that have established privacy rights for contraception, interracial marriage, 
abortion, and family. He recounts a long list of precedents and once at the bottom of it he 
finds no connection between these topics and “homosexual sodomy.”121 Confirming this, 
Justice White states that, “No no connection between family, marriage, or procreation, on the 
one hand, and homosexual activity, on the other, has been demonstrated, either by the Court 
of Appeals or by respondent.”122 Here Justice White is setting up gays as a criminal other. 
They are an outsider from society because their lives do not resemble the expectations of the 
majority. Justice White’s understanding seems to be that gays do not marry, have families, or 
raise children. They are also criminal because sodomy is a practice that the Court intends to 
outlaw. Based on Justice White’s reading, it can be argued that gays are a group looking to 
obtain rights that they are not qualified to receive.
123
 Justice White continues, “Moreover, 
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any claim that these cases nevertheless stand for the proposition that any kind of private 
sexual conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription 
is unsupportable.”124 Here Justice White is following the logic of Carey v. Population 
Services when the Court argued that the line established by Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe 
was about procreation and not a notion of expanded sexual freedom.
125
 It is this group that 
practice sodomy which the Court finds lacking protections. For the majority, sodomy is the 
defining characteristic of homosexuality exemplified when White describes Hardwick as a 
“practicing homosexual.”126 This links sodomy to homosexuality by stating that those that 
are not practicing sodomy cannot actively identify as homosexuals. Heterosexuals represent 
the default societal norm.
127
 The Court views heterosexual relationships as normal and so 
they have worked to protect this type of couple’s place and privilege within the “the concept 
of ordered liberty” that is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”128 Justice 
White’s concern for tradition has him turn to a historical overview of sodomy laws to 
determine the historical traditions of an ordered sexual liberty in the United States and 
whether homosexual sodomy conforms to these standards.
129
 Upon a review, Justice White 
does not find this linkage and “to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is ‘deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ is 
                                                          
124
 Bowers, p. 191 
125
 Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), 688-689. 
126
 Bowers, 188. 
127
 Janet Halley, “Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and after Bowers v. Hardwick,” Virginia Law 
Review 79 (1993):  1731; Rosemary Hennessy and Chrys Ingraham, “Putting the Heterosexual Order in Crisis,” 
Mediations: Journal of the Marxist Literary Group 16, no.2 (May 1992), 18. 
128
 Bowers, p. 191-192. 
129
 Chief Justice Burger also makes continues the argument that anti-sodomy views are part in parcel to the 
history of Western civilization. The Chief Justice points to the prohibition of sodomy in Roman law, in English 
law after the Reformation, and finally in 1816 when Georgia passed its first sodomy statute as examples of the 
deep seated roots that proscriptions against sodomy have in the Western Christian moral tradition stating that, 
“To hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast 
aside millennia of moral teaching,” Bowers, Chief Justice Burger concurring, 196-197. 
 40 
 
at best, facetious.”130 Justice White uses the following review of American sodomy laws to 
argue that “[p]roscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots” and because of this no 
rights should be extended to gays: 
[Sodomy] was a criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by laws of the 
original 13 States when they ratified the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of the 37 States in the Union had criminal sodomy 
laws. In fact, until 1961, all 50 States outlawed sodomy, and today, 24 States and the 
District of Columbia continue to provide criminal penalties for sodomy preformed in 
private between consenting adults.
131
 
For the Court, the length of time a law has existed is important, because long held traditions 
reflect the most successful social practices. The state is concerned most with promoting those 
social practices which best benefit the social harmony and development of the population as 
a whole. Gays are seen by the majority as perverse individuals who break both traditional and 
natural laws that govern acceptable moral behavior since biblical times. In his concurrence, 
Chief Justice Burger echoes Justice White’s concerns about traditional moral values stating 
that, “to hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental 
right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching.”132 From this perspective, 
“homosexuals were a bad type of person.”133 Hence, when the Court looks to prohibitions 
against sodomy, they look back at their ancient roots as a confirmation of those anti-sodomy 
attitudes, a social practice, and a part of the natural workings of the moral mindset of the 
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population as a whole. Chief Justice Burger makes this case when he quotes the English legal 
theorist William Blackstone’s description of sodomy as “‘the infamous crime against nature’ 
as an offense of ‘deeper malignity’ than rape, a heinous act ‘the very mention of which is a 
disgrace to human nature…’”134 The objective of the state is the ordered management of a 
country’s population, as a group of people as well as a set of social and economic 
phenomena, for the betterment of the state.
135
 We see the Court’s governmental logic 
demonstrated by the majority’s insistence that marriage, the family, and procreation are the 
defining characteristics of heterosexual life and that gays should be criminalized because 
they break the social fabric. 
The Bowers decision set about to determine what sexual norms would be accepted by 
the state through the judicial mechanism. Foucault states that “it is the tactics of government 
that allows the continual definition of what should or should not fall within the state’s 
domain, what is public and what private.”136 The state continued to hold a monopoly on the 
power to decide moral issues in the United States and the Supreme Court, as one element of 
the state, would make sure that the judiciary would continue to be relevant in deciding these 
issues. Drawing from the greater society’s disapproval of alternate sexual orientations since 
the concept was developed in the late 19
th
 century, as well as more ancient philosophical and 
religious considerations, Justice White’s opinion demonstrates the thinking that there could 
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be no constitutional right to engage in the practice because it goes against the social norm.
137
 
In this way, people will govern themselves by refraining from homosexual behavior or 
concealing it, because they fear the social and legal repercussions of publicly admitting their 
homosexual status. This is important for the state, because it promotes several perceived 
social benefits: ensuring that the population increases through the creation of children, 
ensuring less reliance on the state for social services through the institution of marriage, 
promotes social harmony through the suppression of differences within the population, and 
helps to promote public health through the suppression of more widespread sexual activity.
138
 
Social cohesion is something that the state wishes to promote and G. William Domhoff 
argues, “Social cohesion [also] aids in the development of policy cohesion.”139  When these 
social, economic, and political cleavages manifest themselves too sharply, governmental 
response can be slow or almost non-existent due to tensions within institutions themselves.
140
 
The state is also interested in the wellness of the public as a whole by tracking health trends 
of the component parts of the population.
141
 Gorman-Murray and Waitt (2009) offer a deeper 
understanding of social cohesion by examining Forrest and Kearns’s (2001) five factors that 
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promote social cohesion, “(1) common values and goals, with shared morality and codes of 
behavior; (2) social order…cooperation, tolerance, respect for difference…absence of 
general conflict.”142 From this perspective, the Bowers Court seems to be abiding by these 
interests. It provides historical evidence that Western society at large has had animosity 
towards the act of sodomy. The Court provides for a strengthening of the social order by 
affirming the outlawing behavior that is at odds with the community. And the Court, from its 
perspective, promotes social solidarity with continued enforcement of sodomy statutes 
towards reforming people’s behavior to conform to the standards of the heterosexual 
tradition. 
Historian Margot Canaday’s book, The Straight State, illustrates the state’s interest in 
social cohesion and stability. In the book, Canaday studies the areas of immigration, military, 
and social welfare and argues that during the 20
th
 century with the rise of modern 
bureaucratic governmental institutions that the state recognized homosexuality as a category 
of individual and developed means to deal with homosexuality.
143
 In the area of immigration, 
for example, the state has been concerned with the economic and moral character of the 
people trying to immigrate to the United States.
144
 In the early 20
th
 century, these 
immigration policies served to promote heterosexual morality and gender norms by 
scrutinizing the poor who attempted to enter the country, because poverty was thought to 
promote perversion.
145
  This search for homosexuality or at least the act of sodomy amongst 
the poor was also a way of preserving heterosexual gender norms, because homosexuality 
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and sodomy were thought of as feminine.
146
 To exclude these people from the United States 
was to ensure that the men of the United States acted like men and the women acted like 
women. In the end, Canaday reveals how these interventions by state institutions have been 
able to shape the meaning of homosexuality and the dominant position of heterosexual norms 
in the United States.
147
 
As the courts begin to take on cases that involve reproduction and intimate social 
relationships, the courts must determine for themselves what best constitutes appropriate and 
moral behaviors in these realms.
148
 In the Bowers case, the Court intertwines definitions of 
family with heterosexuality.
149
 Justice White’s reading of precedents sees the family as the 
arena for procreation and the propagation of the population when he states that “no 
connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual 
activity on the other has been demonstrated, either by the Court of Appeals or by 
respondent.”150 Here Justice White is echoing Justice Joseph Bradley’s sentiments about the 
family in Maynard v. Hill (1888). In Maynard, Justice Bradley states that “[the family] is an 
institution in the maintenance of which its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the 
foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor 
progress.”151 This illustrates that the composition and moral standing of the family has been a 
concern of the Supreme Court and government at large for a very long time. In addition, we 
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see that the state sees those that would advocate or practice another way of life as outside the 
bounds of civilization as criminal others. 
Justice White argues that these precedents did not layout a broader right to private 
sexual conduct, stating that “the Court’s opinion in Carey twice asserted that the privacy 
right, which the Griswold line of cases found to be one of the protections, provided by the 
Due Process Clause, did not reach so far.”152 One can see Justice White’s line of thinking by 
looking to the sections of Carey that he argues refutes a more open interpretation of the 
privacy right granted by the Due Process Clause. In the Carey decision, the Court finds fault 
with Justice Powell’s concurrence in Carey -- that restrictions on sexual freedom are only 
justified if they can demonstrate a compelling state interest, but stops short of answering the 
“difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes 
regulating [private consensual sexual] behavior among adults.”153 Here Justice White has 
room to argue that the Court’s previous precedents don’t state whether the Court should or 
should not proscribe certain forms of sexual behavior. 
  Because gays and lesbians are unable to conceive and raise children, they cannot form 
the basic social unit: the family. In his brief to the Court, Attorney General Bowers takes up 
this sentiment when he argues that “the [Georgia sodomy] statute most certainly does not 
interfere with personal decisions concerning marriage or family life, the raising of children or 
their education, or which members of a family will be permitted to live together.”154 This is 
because straight couples, even though they are included under the Georgia statute, are not 
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under the same sort of threat of prosecution as gays.
155
 In all actuality, the law is aimed at 
curbing those elements that pose a threat to the social norms that have governed society. 
From this reasoning, they are not entitled to constitutional protections whose aims are to 
benefit solely families. We can see this explicitly in the brief of Attorney General Bowers 
when he states that: 
The common principles of this Court's privacy decisions have revolved around 
marriage, the family, the home and decisions as to whether through procreation the 
ancient cycles will begin again and, if so, in what manner the new generation will be 
brought up. These rights have always been with us, and are part of us. Sodomy is not 
now and has never been a right, fundamental or statutory…156 
Justice White uses the Attorney General’s thoughts as the basis for his argument.157 Two 
important points about the Bowers decision need to be examined. First, the majority reading 
of Georgia’s sodomy law ignores the statute’s categorically neutral language and instead 
finds it to be a homosexual sodomy statue.
158
 Justice White makes the point of the Bowers 
case clear when he states, “The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a 
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”159 This new understanding made 
it possible for the Court to ignore questions about straight sexual activities and to re-inscribe 
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the Constitution with a “not like-straight” meaning. The Court deploys this “not like-straight” 
thinking in its evaluation of gays as a class. This means that it views gays as different from 
and not at all like straights. This leaves gays outside the bounds of the law and acceptable 
society and therefore a criminal other. This lays out the governing principles of the Court in 
regards to sexual relations. Positive sexual relationships are those that are vested between a 
man and a woman for the purpose of procreation and the development of a family according 
to governmental rationality.
160
 This is because the family betters the state as an economic and 
social unit that it beneficial to the state. As Justice Powell argues, the moral fabric of the 
family must be protected “precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in 
this nation's history and tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down 
many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.”161 This is so for many reasons: the 
family provides a system of social support in tough economic times, it educates children in 
the values and social norms of a given society, and the family provides a site for the state to 
learn about the population.
162
 Lawmakers are concerned with "promoting healthy marriage" 
as a "very important Government interest."
163
 Within government, politicians argue about 
how to best tackle the economic conditions of women and families. Both conservative and 
liberal law makers have tackled the issue of poverty, women, and their correlation to the 
family: 
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[Conservatives lament] if only more women could be brought within marriage's 
protective domain…both by getting more women to marry, and also by strengthening 
the core meaning of marriage as a life-long social and, especially, economic 
commitment –fewer women would live in poverty…[Meanwhile liberal critics] posit, 
[governmental policies] must tackle directly the crisis of female poverty, locating 
both its causes and its potential solutions in, for example, education and labor 
policies, rather than deflecting discussions of women's financial needs into the private 
family.
164
 
What this demonstrates is policymakers’ interest in women and the family as the most 
important economic site in American society. State institutions are also supremely interested 
in the education of citizens, as the Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) states, “There is no 
doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to 
impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education... Providing 
public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a State.”165 Yet in Yoder, the 
paramount place of the family is secured by ensuring that parents have the right to educate 
their children with the beliefs of their cultural and religious identity.
166
 The state is interested 
in the overall development of its citizens and as such takes great lengths to ensure that this 
development is carried out. 
Second, the Court rejects its own ability to challenge normative sexuality. Instead, it 
buttresses the norm when it states that the case “does not require a judgment on whether laws 
                                                          
164
 Ariela R. Dubler, "In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal Construction of the Family and 
the State," The Yale Law Journal 112, no. 7 (May 2003): 1641-1715, 1643. 
165
 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), 213. For more on the state’s interest in ensuring that family’s 
educate their children see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), 543. 
166
 Yonder, 213-214. 
 49 
 
against sodomy between consenting adults in general, or between homosexuals in particular, 
are wise or desirable.”167 However, by narrowing Hardwick’s question to just whether a 
fundamental constitutional right to homosexual sodomy exists, the Court has already made a 
moralizing decision. The Court’s attitude is further reinforced later in the decision when it 
states that it: 
[Strives] to assure itself and the public that announcing rights not readily identifiable 
in the Constitution’s text involves much more than the imposition of the Justices’ 
own choice of values on the States and the Federal Government, the Court has sought 
to identify the nature of the rights qualifying for heightened judicial protection.
168
 
Yet it seems that the assertion that the Court remains objectively neutral in cases that involve 
heated moral questions remains a dubious claim. Bowers is clearly a reflection of the Court’s 
governmental thought process that privileges heterosexual relationships. The Court has found 
that gay and lesbian behavior contradicts longstanding historical social norms and because of 
this, it does not serve the state’s interest to extend Constitutional protections to said 
behavior.
169
 Instead, the criminalization of “homosexual sodomy” continues to serve 
legitimate and useful state interests because the statute adheres to the moral sentiments of the 
majority of people. 
The Court’s decision to overturn the Federal Appeals Court’s ruling was firmly 
cemented in the rationale of government and the accompanying “not like straight” logic that 
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defined homosexuality as a criminal other. The first instance of this “not like straight” 
thinking can be seen in Justice White’s agreement with the Eleventh Circuit Court that the 
straight couple, who were also a party to the case, did not possess standing before the 
Court.
170
 Justice White makes the claim that because no heterosexuals are legitimately part of 
the suit and Hardwick is a “practicing” homosexual, his challenge to the Georgia sodomy 
statue must be read in terms of how it applies solely to homosexual sodomy.
171
 The decision, 
“says to [heterosexuals]: if your acts of sodomy are heterosexual acts of sodomy, they can be 
forgotten, omitted, erased-not only not prosecuted but not remembered,” holding up 
heterosexuality as the social norm and reaffirms heterosexuality’s unquestionable nature.172 
The second instance of this “not like straight” and criminalizing logic lies in the Court’s 
inability to find any resemblance between the expansion of sexual privacy rights granted to 
heterosexuals in previous cases and the sexual privacy claims made by Hardwick. Justice 
White quotes a long list of precedents but in the end concludes “that none…bears any 
resemblance… [:] [N]o connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand 
and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated.”173 As Conway pointed out 
earlier, this is an example of the Court’s deliberate not understanding.174 In refusing to 
acknowledge the logically broader implications of these precedents, and taking them to their 
logical conclusion, this line of thinking produces a regulatory mechanism of sexuality based 
on the heterosexual social norm by the Court. This is an example of the socialization and 
scientification of sexual behavior that Foucault describes as a mechanism of knowledge and 
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power in regards to sexuality.
175
 Canaday points out that “after the Second World War, an 
increasingly powerful state wrote [its new] knowledge [of homosexuality] into federal policy, 
helping to produce the category of homosexuality through regulation.”176 The juridical 
apparatus functions to “screen the sexuality of couples, parents and children” and determine 
right, natural, and permissible sexual behavior.
177
 This is exactly what the Court has done in 
its analysis of precedent when it dichotomizes straight sexual behavior and gay sexual 
behavior. Anchoring his opinion on a comparison between the Court’s decisions on family’s 
inherent duty to procreate for the state, Justice White concluded, “No connection between 
family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has 
been demonstrated…any claim that these cases nevertheless stand for the proposition that 
any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally insulated 
from state proscription is unsupportable.”178 For the Court, the driving social unit of society 
has been the heterosexual couple which comes together, in the end, to procreate and form a 
family, anyone else is outside the bounds of society as a criminal other. Here we see that 
previous precedents have supported this line of thinking in which the rights of couples has 
been expanded to include access to contraception, the choice of spouse through the 
elimination of anti-miscegenation laws, and the legalization of abortions. These cases have, 
in the end, involved the state stepping in to support a broader range of family planning 
choices for couples, which allows the population as a whole to make decisions about how to 
run a family and how large a family should be up.
179
 Justice White supports this 
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interpretation when he points out that precedent has set by Carey v. Population Services 
International did not extend Constitutional protections to all forms of sexual behavior.
180
 
Moreover, Justice White goes on to make the claim that the Court “[strives] to assure itself 
and the public that announcing rights not readily identifiable in the Constitution’s text 
involves much more than the imposition of the Justices’ own choice of values…”181 Justice 
White reveals a twofold line of reasoning. First, it shows that the Court is aware that the 
public watches its decision-making, and because of this the Court must respond in a way that 
is viewed as legitimate by the public. Second, it shows that the Court itself functions with a 
governmental rationality, independent, or at least above, the ideologies of the individual 
justices. Socialization plays a key role in perpetuating social, economic, and political 
institutions. The justices, as members of society, have been socialized and those base beliefs 
and ideas promoted by the state such as nationalism, religion, capitalism, respect for 
authority and the rule of law surely plays a role in how they decide cases. On a conscious 
level, the justices are keenly aware of their position in society and within their institution 
which creates a belief that the state and its institutions that they serve should be safeguarded 
and maintained. This is an important factor because many scholars have argued that the 
Supreme Court operates, fundamentally, according to the justices’ ideological leanings.182 
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However, what seems more important to the work of the Supreme Court is the project of 
governmentality that the state has undertaken.  
Productive Identity Construction in Bowers 
The penultimate question is: why was it seen as productive for the state to criminalize 
homosexuality? This has to do with shaping identities that the state finds acceptable. It also 
has to do with what makes a productive citizen and the state’s vital interest in producing 
productive citizens.
183
 The Court, in the case of homosexuality, played a big role in shaping 
gay identity through the Bowers decision. As Conway notes, narrative in judicial opinions is 
important because the Justices speak on behalf of the parties to a case and are, therefore, 
responsible for crafting the image presented to the reader.
184
 As I have argued earlier in this 
paper, the goal of the Supreme Court, as well as all institutions of the state, is the production 
of productive citizens to build a stronger population and a stronger state. Thus, sexual 
intimacy is important to the state due to the social ties that bind a family.
185
 In Bowers, the 
Court came to the conclusion that that best way to produce productive citizens, in terms of 
how sexual practices shape them, was to continue the criminalization and stigmatization of 
sexual acts carried out by a minority of the population. 
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From the perspective of an analytics of government, we come to the field of visibility. 
In this instance, the Court’s object of study is gay and lesbian subjects. For the Bowers Court, 
productive citizens come down to those that conform to the standards of traditional 
heterosexual family. This means that a productive citizen is a heterosexual that marries, starts 
a stable family, has children, is economically independent of the state, conforms to the moral 
traditions of majority, and follows the rules and obligations that the state sets out. Non-
productive citizens are those people that don’t follow these economic, moral, social, and 
political conventions. This puts these people in a strained relationship to the state and calls 
into question their place within society and whether they might even be considered citizens 
of the community at all, even if they still possess citizenship in the most technical sense. 
According to the Bowers Court, gays are not productive citizens and the Court sees gays as 
primarily a group of people who are defined by their engagement with the sexual act of 
sodomy.
186
 Because gays exist outside the realm of the productive citizen, the Court acts to 
penalize their behavior and brands them a criminal other. The Court constructs a “practicing 
homosexual” as a man who engages in a sex act that has been antithetical to the traditional 
moral teachings of Western civilization for millennia and is counterproductive to the state 
because he has chosen not to participate in a relationship with a woman under the institution 
of marriage.
187
  
The Court’s choice to define gays as criminal others raises a number of interesting 
questions. Why does the Court, in this instance, choose to criminalize this behavior? Why 
then construct a narrative that portrays gays as criminal others? Ultimately, what the justices 
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are hoping for by criminalizing sodomy is the correction of said behavior through societal 
norms and self-government which represents the most effective tool of governmentality. The 
state has an interest in ensuring that the family structure remains intact. As Canaday puts it, 
“the state [is] concerned with using is resources to settle men… (think marriage, home, and 
reproduction).”188 The logic of governmentality relies on the society to establish and enforce 
norms. In the context of sodomy, the majority of people have, at least when Bowers was 
decided, a negative view towards sodomy and homosexuality. 
This brings us to the importance of social norms. Societal norms help shape the world 
in which we live. They guide the way we do things and the way we interact with people on a 
day to day basis. Why then are norms good in the eyes of the state? What purpose do they 
serve? Why is it productive to pursue normative policies? As both Justice White and Burger 
point out, norms that govern moral behavior have existed unchallenged for a long time.
189
 
David Evans argues, the state must pursue policies that “do not subvert the absolute moral 
sexual standards” of the community because otherwise the state might lose legitimacy.190 The 
majority also favor these values because they have been long ingrained in the social structure 
of society in one form or another. Traditional norms also exist because they have been 
perpetuated through history. Therefore, these behavioral norms have mostly worked within 
society, otherwise they would be discarded and as such, the majority of people tend to favor 
them as ways of doing things. 
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In the context of homosexuality, Justice White and Chief Justice Burger argue that 
sodomy is outside the moral teachings that have shaped Western civilization and the United 
States.
191
 Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe offers a glimpse of how the Court sees itself and 
how it sees its role in maintaining the morals of society: 
The inclusion of the category of morality among state concerns indicates that society 
is not limited in its objects only to the physical wellbeing of the community, but has 
traditionally concerned itself with the moral soundness of its people as well… 
Adultery, homosexuality, and the like are sexual intimacies which the State forbids 
altogether, but the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an essential and 
accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an institution which the State not only 
must allow, but which, always and in every age, it has fostered and protected. It is one 
thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid extramarital sexuality altogether, 
or to say who may marry, but it is quite another when…it undertakes to regulate by 
means of the criminal law the details of that intimacy.
192
 
The Court clearly lays out the state’s interest in perpetuating its own moral agenda. 
The Court acknowledges the role that law plays and the role the Court plays in determining 
not only who can marry, but also what the content of that marriage will look like. The Court 
refrains from tampering with straight couples relationships on the one hand and forbids 
same-sex relationships on the other. The criminalization of alternative social and sexual 
relationships attempts to foreclose other possible kinship relations.
193
 The practice of sodomy 
breaks social and moral traditions and must be opposed on these grounds. The state 
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accomplishes the introduction of norms and normalization through both a direct 
pronouncement of what is and is not permissible through the law and through disseminating 
these norms by way of the people themselves.
194
 The state is most successful when people 
internalize these norms, correct their own behavior, and chastise the incorrect behavior of 
others. From this line of thinking, it can be inferred that the Court believes that legal 
prohibition of sodomy will drive people away from the practice. 
Another example of the state’s interest in making homosexuals a criminal other can 
be seen in government policies during the Great Depression when the state began to study the 
social situation of American families. The state found that many couples were forced to live 
with parents, communally with other couples, or to put off marriage all together due to their 
inability to support themselves in these harsh economic conditions.
195
 The government 
became concerned due to the overwhelming number transient men who, after failing to 
provide for themselves and their families felt a certain feminization, were imbued with a 
sexually charged wanderlust.
196
 The supposed promiscuity of men, coupled with their 
identification as the household’s bread winner, becomes the primary factors that drive 
welfare policies towards families. This concern for the economic wellbeing of the family 
drove the state to pursue policies that pushed unemployed men out of the street and back into 
the home and institutionalized those that could not be reformed.
197
 We can see that in social 
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welfare and the courts, the maintenance of traditional family structures remains an important 
goal for the state.
198
  
The Court also plays a role in reinforcing the social norms that already exist. Public 
disapproval of gays means that people from an early age will be socialized to disapprove of 
homosexuality. This puts a lot of social pressure on gay people to conform to heterosexual 
norms or be cast out of mainstream society and labeled a criminal. These social fears of 
discrimination, in turn, act on gay people to self-govern and conform to the heterosexual 
norm by marrying and beginning families with people of the opposite sex. The intention is to 
reintegrate those individuals who might stray from social norms back into the 
heteronormative family-oriented fold.
199
 The goals of these sorts of social programs are not 
merely punish someone, but to reform them into a productive, ‘normal’ member of society, 
often through the use of incentives.
200
 
Another question emerges: does the limited judicial enforcement of sodomy laws 
matter? No, enough enforcement of sodomy laws by the police keeps homosexual activity at 
bay. The state, at one time or another, also enforced removal of gays from military, 
immigration, federal jobs, and welfare ensuring that discouragement was felt.
201
 This worked 
to keep gays in the closet or at the margins of American society. This also set the example for 
society at large who perpetuated animosity towards gays, further ensuring their status as 
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criminal others. Even if they are gay, the stigma will encourage them to remain closeted and 
follow the productive heterosexual paradigm. 
The modern reasoning of government is based on a rational and scientific 
understanding of the nation and its population.
202
 By examining non-normative sexualities, 
the Court codifies and strengthens them even in its attempts to curtail and control them. The 
Court can give existence to sexualities by acknowledging their existence within the 
framework of the state and by codifying definitions of sexualities in legal opinions. The 
Court is able to mold interpretations and explanations in the way that it sees fit. In the context 
of the 1980s, the Bowers decision makes logical sense according to governmental rationality. 
What the Court is faced with, in its view, is a social group that evokes intense animosity from 
the broader society. Gays and lesbians, especially in the context of the emerging AIDS 
epidemic and the American Psychological Association’s delisting of homosexuality as a 
mental illness barely 10 years prior, could be seen as individuals who cause a lot of social 
upheaval by breakings traditional gender roles and sexual stereotypes and by being perceived 
as potentially sick individuals, either mentally or physically. From a public health and safety 
standpoint, it might be viewed as better to criminalize and marginalize this community, so 
that real or imagined social and health ills are not spread into the straight community. Both 
the possibility of disease and the breakdown of the traditional family represent a challenge to 
the functioning of modern society which relies upon, more and more, the family to take on 
the economic and social aspects of life that are being removed from the social welfare state. 
Bowers represents the Court’s attempt to mitigate these negative trends by identifying gays 
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as criminal others. In the next section, we will examine how Romer v. Evans focuses on how 
Court’s amended governmental rationality would shape a new gay identity. 
Romer v. Evans – Gays and Lesbians as Just Like Everyone Else 
This section will track how the Court dealt with homosexual identity in the Romer 
decision. First, I will chart out the history behind the Romer case. Then, I will analyze the 
Romer decision and examine governmentality’s place in it.  Finally, I’ll discuss identity 
construction in Romer and how the logical of governmentality would respond by creating a 
productive identity for gays and lesbians as a “just like everyone else” in the eyes of the state. 
The History of Romer 
Romer v. Evans emerged out of a 1992 amendment to the Colorado State 
Constitution.
203
 Over the previous few years, a number of Colorado’s urban centers, Denver 
(1991), Aspen (1977), and Boulder (1987) had extended protection from discrimination in 
employment and housing to their LGBT populations.
204
 In 1990, Governor Roy Romer 
issued an executive order barring discrimination based on sexual orientation in state 
employment.
205
 This extension of rights to gay and lesbian individuals triggered a backlash 
from conservative activists within Colorado. Colorado for Family Values then started a 
petition campaign and placed a constitutional amendment, called Amendment 2, on the 1992 
ballot which stated that the local or state government: 
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Shall not enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby 
homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall 
constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have 
or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of 
discrimination.
206
 
At the polls, a majority of Colorado voters voted in favor of Amendment 2.
207
 A coalition of 
citizens, unions, and local governments filed a suit in Denver District Court to enjoin the 
implementation of Amendment 2 on the grounds that it was unconstitutional.
208
 After 
reviewing the evidence, the trial court found that the plaintiffs’ case had merit and issued a 
restraining order against the amendment.
209
 The defendant then appealed the case to the 
Colorado Supreme Court.
210
 The Colorado Supreme Court took up the case and agreed with 
the ACLU’s argument that the law created a barrier to the LBGT community’s “fundamental 
right to participate in the political process.”211 The infringement of a fundamental right 
caused the court to use strict scrutiny, meaning that the state would have to provide a 
compelling interest to sustain the law. The court remanded the case back to the original trial 
court where the challenge to the validity of the law would be heard. Colorado’s legal defense 
of Amendment 2 consisted of four points. First, they made it clear that Colorado voters had 
wanted to make a statement about the morality of homosexuality without resorting to the 
criminalization of the intimate practices of gays and lesbians.
212
 Second, the state argued that 
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gay rights should not be conflated with civil rights because the gay lifestyle was a choice 
whereas a person’s skin color or sex was an innate characteristic of a person that could not be 
changed.
213
 Third, the state argued that Amendment 2 protected the religious rights of 
Coloradans by allowing them to exercise their religious beliefs through the people that they 
hired for their businesses or who they provided services to.
214
 Finally, the state argued that 
Amendment 2 deterred factionalism within the state due to the “deeply divisive issue of 
homosexuality.”215 The state put forth the claim that issues of sexual orientation and 
protections for people of different sexual orientations led to adverse political polarization in 
the state and that upholding Amendment 2 would bring back social harmony by suppressing 
the issues surrounding sexual orientation. The trial court judge found that the state of 
Colorado did have a compelling interest in Amendment 2. However, he noted that these 
interests were too disparately connected to Amendment 2 to survive strict scrutiny.
216
 
Therefore, Amendment 2 was ruled unconstitutional and the Colorado Supreme Court then 
affirmed the injunction that blocked Amendment 2’s implementation. From there, the 
decision was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court 
agreed and stuck down Amendment 2. 
 
 
                                                          
213
 Ibid., 282. 
214
 Ibid. 
215
 Here Eskridge quotes the Romer Petitioner’s Brief to the Supreme Court. Ibid., 282. 
216
 Ibid. Eskridge draws on several sources: Timothy M. Tymkovich, et al., “A Tale of Three Theories: Reason 
and Prejudice in the Battle over Amendment 2,” University of Colorado Law Review 68 (1997): 287-333; Lisa 
Melinda Keen and Suzanne Beth Goldberg, Strangers to the Law: Gay People on Trial, Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 1998, 133-157; Richard F. Duncan, “Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights 
Legislation, Public Policy, and Religious Freedom,” Notre Dame Law Review 69 (1994), 393-445. 
 63 
 
A Discussion of the Logic of Governmentality in the Romer Decision 
Next, I will discuss governmental reasoning as it works in the Romer decision. Then I 
will discuss why the Court, in the Romer decision, constructed a gay identity that saw them 
as just like everyone else. The negative or absent place that gays and lesbians occupy within 
the law demonstrates the privileged position of straight people in the United States.
217
 The 
state made it clear that it regarded heterosexuals as productive citizens, as opposed to gays. 
The state preferred to extend to heterosexuals social, political, and economic opportunities 
and advantages through mechanisms such as taxes breaks for married couples, protection for 
parental rights, Medicare and social security benefits for widowed spouses, and a whole host 
of other benefits. That was, and in many instances still is, the case.
218
 One has to ask what the 
possible outcome of such an understanding is? Most heterosexuals had concluded that the 
government was correct in this decision to treat them favorably, since it is in their best 
interests.
219
 What is important here is that the Court has been in line with the general 
attitudes of the population at large as well as the other way around. In contrast, gay rights 
activists are trying to be granted these rights and so they must petition the state for them. As 
a result, the gay rights movement must present itself in the most acceptable manner possible 
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in order to have the best chance for success.
220
 They can appeal to the sympathy of the 
majority in this fashion. This is to the Court’s benefit too because, as Justice White pointed 
out earlier, the Court is constantly afraid of losing legitimacy in the eyes of the public.
221
 The 
attitude of the population at large represents the success of institutions in shaping the 
attitudes towards gays and lesbians. 
Change in the social conditions of the 1990s, however, would pose a challenge to the 
reasoning of the Court’s previous decision. Justice Kennedy’s majority decision in Romer 
straddles a line between Bowers’ “not like straight” logic and Lawrence’s “like straight” 
logic. The Romer majority continues Bowers’ “not like straight” logic for more benevolent 
ends by seeking to remove the gay’s status as criminals, at least partly, that the Bowers 
decision lay upon them. It accomplishes this through its departure from Bowers’ essentialist 
view of gay behavior and identity. Instead, they rely on a nominalist view that gays and 
lesbians are merely a named class who are not intrinsically imbued with defining 
characteristics.
222
 For Justice Kennedy, gays and lesbians take on traits as they are actively 
engaged with society and the law.
223
 As with straight people, Justice Kennedy views the 
sexual orientation of gays and lesbians as merely one trait that they possess among many.
224
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What we see in Romer is the beginning of a “like straight” logic emerging in Court 
discourse. This differs from the logic of Bowers which set people apart according to sexual 
orientation and gender. For the Romer majority, “the real content of the class is quite beside 
the point: if the same discrimination were inflicted on blondes or burglars, the same 
conclusion would follow.”225 From this quote, we see that the Court feels that gays should be 
treated like any other group, the most obvious equivalent being heterosexuals, within society. 
The State of Colorado made the claim that Amendment 2’s purpose was to merely to prevent 
gays from obtaining special rights. However, the Court majority did not find this line of 
reasoning compelling.
226
 The Court finds that even if Amendment 2 were to simply repeal 
the existing protections for sexual orientation, it would not be a legitimate state interest.
227
 
The Romer Court, however, notes that the scope was far larger than merely removing 
existing protections. Instead, gays would be singled out and afforded no protections as a 
group of people based on their sexual orientation, thus opening up the possibility of 
widespread discrimination and no recourse to resolve it.
228
  
The Court begins to reconsider the governmental relationship between the state, the 
law, and sexual minorities. The Court interest in this is in biopower: the attempt by the state 
to understand, influence, and control the biological world, especially human biology.
229
 
Foucault states that biopolitics “aims to treat the ‘population’ as a set of coexisting living 
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beings with particular biological and pathological features, and which as such falls under 
specific forms of” knowledges and techniques such as public health and hygiene, medicine, 
sociology, psychology.
230
 Changing social attitudes over the preceding decade likely played a 
role in how the Court viewed gays and lesbians in the Romer decision, including the 
increasingly accepted notion that there is a biological link to sexual orientation.
231
 
Governmental rationality is predicated on a number of distinct features: the tripartite social 
order; the existence of rights, equality and liberty; and the state as the guarantor and protector 
of citizens and rights, as well as constituting the domain of the political.
232
 The most 
important of these, the tripartite social order is comprised of three components that make up 
modern society: the private sphere of the family, the public sphere of the economy and civil 
society, and the state itself.
233
 These facets of society are all interconnected but, at the same 
time, distinct from one another. It is the task of the state to manage all three component parts. 
The Court plays a role in this as the distinction between all three parts is clear, within the 
law, and they are each treated differently by the law. As Foucault puts it, governing these 
components of society is a matter of: 
Ensuring that the state only intervenes to regulate, or rather allow the [natural] well-
being, the interest of each to adjust itself in such a way that it can actually serve all... 
[in a manner that ensures the] processes of a naturalness specific to relations between 
                                                          
230
 Foucault, Security, 367. 
231
 For polling of public attitudes towards gays and lesbians see the Gallup poll supra note 219. 
232
 Brown, 145-146. 
233
 Ibid., 144-148. 
 67 
 
men, to what happens spontaneously when they cohabit, come together, exchange, 
work, and produce…the naturalness of society.”234 
The point for the state, then, is to guide society in a way that ensures the continued 
functioning of society but not in a way that overbearingly regulates the bounds of liberty of 
the individual and population at large. This emphasis on the naturalness of society and the 
need to work within the bounds of it differs from; say the regime of feudalism and the logic 
of sovereignty which placed subjects at the mercy of the goals of the sovereign and their 
obedience to the law. This new governmental reasoning, imbued with the understanding of 
the economy, has transformed the institutions of the state into agents of surveillance and 
regulation of society and not merely the agent of sovereign juridical power. As Foucault 
asserts, “a condition of governing well is that freedom, or certain forms of freedom, are really 
respected. Failing to respect freedom is not only an abuse of rights with regard to the law; it 
is above all ignorance of how to govern properly.”235 What, then, does this mean for the 
Court? It means that the Court serves the interests of society and the population, in the most 
efficient and productive way possible, when it constructs a constitutional framework that 
emphasizes personal freedoms and participation in the society and the political system. To do 
otherwise discourages people from being active in society and creates any number of 
economic, social, and public health ills.
236
 
                                                          
234
 Foucault, Security, 346. 
235
 Foucault, Security, 353. 
236
 This line of thinking can be seen in Canaday’s work, the Straight State, and her examination of welfare 
policies during the Great Depression. She shows how this economic turmoil, and the lack of adequate 
government response during the early parts of the crisis, pushed men and boys towards a life of vagrancy and, 
from a contemporary point of view, into the arms of debaucherous and perverse behavior amongst themselves. 
 68 
 
According to the logic of Amendment 2, the essential characteristic of homosexuality 
cannot be ignored and consequently gays are denied special protections and must rely on 
general legal principles to protect themselves as individual subjects before the law. With 
Bowers remaining law, if it is rational to criminalize gay conduct, it is also rational to 
discriminate the people most likely to engage in said conduct.
237
 Justice Kennedy, on the 
other hand, moves past these issues by finding means to view the discrimination not through 
the lens of any sexual orientation and by constructing sexual orientation as merely a “legal 
personal relationship” and not a form of personhood.238 Justice Kennedy holds that even if 
general laws might protect gays from discrimination, a claim he doubts, the injury that 
Amendment 2 inflicts on gays is far broader than what the state claims it is.
239
 Halley points 
out that Justice Kennedy’s concern about sexual orientation and sexual status “runs not to the 
nature of the group but to the inferences about particularized conduct that an allegation of 
group membership could sustain.”240 The mere mentioning or inferring that a person might 
be gay can lead to discrimination for which no remedy might exist. This creates a slippery 
slope that can lead to real discrimination and so the Court finds “nothing special in the 
protections Amendment 2 withholds. These are protections taken for granted by most people 
either because they already have them or do not need them.”241 Justice Kennedy realizes that 
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in order to put gays on an equal footing as straights, to make them “just like straights”, then 
Amendment 2 cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny even a mere rational basis.
242
 
The Romer Court comes to these conclusions because of governmentality’s interest in 
preserving the rights of individuals in relation to each other and the state.
243
 The state 
protects and influences these interests by being the site of contestation for arguments 
regarding the nature of rights, equality, and liberty in the political system. The major theme 
in Romer, equality before the law, is also a major theme in governmental discourse. The 
naturalness of society is taken for granted by the institutions of the state, including the Court. 
By this logic, all member of a society, the population, are presumed to be equal to one 
another before the law by virtue of being members of the state.
244
 The Court is well aware of 
the principle that all citizens are equal before the law and acted in Romer to defend that 
principle. As Justice Kennedy states, “homosexuals, by state decree, are put in a solitary class 
with respect to transactions and relations in both the private and governmental spheres. The 
amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the 
injuries caused by discrimination, and if forbids reinstatement of these laws and policies.”245 
The Court actually promotes social cohesion by removing a law that clearly targeted one 
group and attempted to strip them of legal recourse from discrimination. 
By coming down against Amendment 2, the Court also acted to further the 
governmental goal of protecting liberty. Liberty, the ability to do what one pleases without 
governmental interference, is seen as a social good by the rationality of government because 
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it allows the population of society to work out amongst them the best ways for conducting 
their lives and their interactions with one another. In this way, Amendment 2 interferes with 
the governmental interests. According to Justice Kennedy, Amendment 2 strips gays and 
lesbians from protections in public accommodations, housing sales, insurance, social welfare 
and health services, private education, and employment.
246
 It also blocks any level of 
government within Colorado from extending protections to gays and lesbians from 
discrimination.
247
 Amendment 2’s intent was to block the state from putting in place 
regulations that would prevent discrimination based on sexual orientation. However, what the 
wording of the amendment actually lays out is a framework that does not block anti-
discrimination legislation in all cases but merely those that involve people who are defined as 
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.
248
 General legal safeguards are denied gays by Amendment 2 
and because of this a specific burden is placed upon them that no other group must endure, 
this is regardless of “how local or discreet the harm” or “how public and widespread the 
injury.”249 Halley provides a mundane, but salient example of how this injury could occur in 
even the most innocuous of settings.
250
 Halley provides the example of a lesbian patron 
trying to obtain a library card from her local library: with Amendment 2 in force the librarian 
could deny the patron a library card on the grounds that “lesbians have no place in a public 
library,” but at the same time, the librarian could issue the card anyway for fear that the 
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patron may have legal remedies available in general law.
251
 Yet the library management 
would be unable to form any coherent and generalized policy regarding the issuance of 
library cards because they would be forbidden from addressing discrimination based on 
homosexual status.
252
 Thus discriminatory policies that target gays make social interaction 
within society arbitrary and difficult for the state to control. The state would become awash 
in a sea of litigation from public and private parties which is something that the state wishes 
to avoid. Foucault points to this when he notes that power “must be understood…as the 
multiplicity of force relations…whose general design or institutional crystallization is 
embodied in the state apparatus, in the formation of the law.”253 What Foucault points out 
here is that the law represents the crystallization of power and force relations within society 
thus enables us to see that the Court plays a vital role in shaping the bounds of the law. The 
Court decision in Romer can be seen as one institution’s attempt to reclaim a bit of its ability 
to govern which might be lost if Amendment 2 remained valid law. The law remains a useful 
tool for the state to govern and shape the population and territory it controls accordingly the 
law remains a vital tool in this endeavor.
254
 This being the case, the Court cannot validate the 
constitutionality of Amendment 2 because it does not conform to its ideals of rational 
government. Amendment 2 works against governmentality’s logic by eliminating the ability 
of people to determine for themselves how best to interact with gays and lesbians. It would 
restrict the ability of the government, individuals, and businesses to work out their own 
policies towards gays and lesbians. Instead, the law works to decide for the population as a 
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whole that gays and lesbians are undeserving of protections from those who would 
discriminate against them. While the decision in Romer does not explicitly argue against the 
Court’s earlier reasoning in Bowers, in regards to sexual liberty, it does spell the end for 
Bowers’s narrow, anti-liberty sentiment with the Court. Logically, the law must be 
overturned because it represents, in one sense, a return to the juridical sovereign 
interpretation of law that narrows the law to a mere list of things that are prohibited, instead 
of the productive force that the law is imbued with under the logic of governmentality. The 
voters of Colorado had overstepped their rightful boundary in passing such a sweeping piece 
of legislation, putting themselves into the position of the sovereign of old and using the law 
as a tool of mere subjugation. 
Governmentality sets its task as the ordered management of society. To ensure this, 
Foucault states that “the basic principle of the state’s role…[is] respect [for] these natural 
processes…take them into account, get them to work, or to work with them…The 
fundamental objective of governmentality…will be state intervention with the essential 
function of ensuring the security of the natural phenomena…”255 The way that society works 
can be studied and what the state learns about society can be applied towards creating 
systems that better manage it.
256
 What we can see in the Romer case is the glimpse of an 
acknowledgement that the Court may be wrong in the way that it has treated gays and 
lesbians. Justice Kennedy opens the opinion by stating that the state has a commitment to the 
law’s neutrality where the rights of people are at stake.257 This can be read as an 
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acknowledgement that there is room for expanding the rights of gays and lesbians. Justice 
Kennedy goes on to argue that gays and lesbians are unfairly put in a “solitary class” that 
easily curtails their private relations and public dealings.
258
 From this perspective “a 
condition of governing well is that freedom…is really respected. Failing to respect freedom 
is not only an abuse of rights with regard to the law; it is above all ignorance of how to 
govern properly.”259 This opens up the opportunity to grant gays and lesbians more rights 
than had previously been accorded them. We see the Court realigning the way it views gays 
so that they can come back into the law and society. 
Productive Identity Construction in Romer 
Romer marks a turning point in the Court’s understanding and opinion of gay identity. 
In Romer, the Court begins to see gays not as criminal others needing to be driven 
underground or from the community, but as an equal member of American society. The heart 
of the Romer case is about gays’ access to public accommodations. Colorado’s Amendment 2 
holds to the standards set in Bowers and aimed to make it acceptable for the state and the 
public to shun gays and lesbians. The law would have continued that practice of treating gays 
and lesbians as criminal others. In this case, the Court takes up the mantle of acceptance of 
gays and pushes the public towards this end through its authority. 
The Court reconsiders the gay identity of Bowers, even if it does not address Bowers 
specifically. The Romer decision is about strengthening the productive forces of the state. 
The focus of the state is in strengthening itself and its population.
260
 Foucault states that those 
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“who govern must know the elements that enable the state to be preserved in its strength or in 
the necessary development of its strength...”261 Consequently when the Romer Court looks to 
gays, it realizes that there is no need to define gays as a criminal other any longer. This is a 
realization that the logic of governmentality, through the tool of normalization, can modify 
gay identity. In the end, gays can become like everyone else. From the rationality of 
government, this is a useful end, because the Court can alter gay identity, taking 
unproductive citizens and making them productive members of society. 
One motivation for this is an economic component to the normalization of gay 
identity. As David Evans states, “the legalization of previously illegal and thus non-
consuming sexual status groups, for example, most spectacularly, male 
homosexuals…[releases] considerable consumer power and [enables] the development of 
considerable specific minority commodity markets.”262 To accomplish this end, however, the 
Court must return gays to an equal footing within society by prohibiting outright 
discrimination.
263
 This is evident by Justice Kennedy’s concern over gays and public 
accommodation.
264
 
Justice Kennedy continues his “just like everyone else” logic in his reading of 
Amendment 2. Justice Kennedy states that “we find nothing special in the protections 
Amendment 2 withholds. There are protections taken for granted by most people either 
because they already have them or do not need them. These are protections against exclusion 
from an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civil 
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life in a free society.”265 This demonstrates Justice Kennedy’s intent to put gays on an equal 
footing with the rest of society and make gays just like everyone else. By transforming gay 
identity into a parallel of the majority is to extend not only the rights, but also the obligations 
of productive citizenship to gays. That is to say, if gays want to be treated equally, they must 
not be “a stranger to the law,” but instead they must conform their behavior to the 
majority.
266
 Accepting gays back into the arms of society is productive, because it sets up 
gays to want to bargain for more rights from the Court. For example, the right to not be 
discriminated against, for their intimate private lives to be decriminalized, and the state to 
recognize their relationships. However, these rights will come with the price of molding their 
image according to the dictates of the Court. We will see this strategy come to fruition when 
we next examine the Court’s decision in Lawrence. 
Lawrence v. Texas – Gays and Lesbians as Just Like Straights 
This section will track how the Court dealt with gay and lesbian identity in the 
Lawrence decision. First, I will chart out the history behind the Lawrence case to provide 
some context. Second, I will analyze the Lawrence decision in order to inspect 
governmentality’s place in the decision.  Finally, I’ll discuss identity construction in 
Lawrence, and how the logic of governmentality worked to create a productive identity for 
gays and lesbians as “just like straights” in the eyes of the state. 
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The History of Lawrence 
First, I will look at the history of Lawrence. In 2003, the Supreme Court significantly 
altered the legal status of gays in the United States. This reflected a larger cultural change 
that had occurred over the previous 17 years which made gays a more visible and stronger 
force within American culture. The courts too, have had an impact on how gays and lesbians 
have been perceived and how they have perceived themselves through language used in 
decisions pertaining to them. 
The specific circumstances that surround the history of Lawrence v. Texas are less 
clear and straight forward than the events of Bowers v. Hardwick.
267
 On the night of 
September 17, 1998, Harris County sheriff’s deputies responded to a call that a man was 
going wild with a gun in an apartment. When the officers arrived at that apartment they 
entered and found John Lawrence and Tyron Garner engaging in consensual sodomy. After 
they were detained, it became apparent that the man who had led the officers to the 
apartment, Robert Eubanks, had phoned in a false police report. All three men were then 
arrested; Eubanks for filing the false report and Lawrence and Garner for violating Texas’s 
homosexual conduct law.
268
 However, all of the arresting officers each gave slightly different 
accounts of the events and John Lawrence, Tyron Garner, and Robert Eubanks have never 
given any public interview that detailed the events of that night. A full history is also unlikely 
to emerge with the death of Eubanks in 2000 and Garner in 2006. This reveals one of the 
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most interesting aspects of the case: the fact that it isn’t known whether any of the sheriff’s 
deputies actually witnessed Lawrence or Garner performing a sex act.
269
 Although two of the 
sheriff’s deputies, Joseph Quinn and William Lilly, still claim that they did witness the 
acts.
270
 Regardless, Officer Carpenter contended that it was only when Lawrence began using 
obscenities toward the officers and became uncooperative that they decided to enforce the 
sodomy statute.
271
 
After the arrest, Garner and Lawrence came into contact with the ACLU and they 
agreed to turn their arrest into a test case before the Supreme Court. They pled not guilty and 
were convicted by a Justice of the Peace. They were then granted a new trial before the 
Harris County Criminal Court. They contended that the homosexual conduct statute was 
unconstitutional. Their claims were rejected by the trial court. Upon appeal, their case 
traveled to the Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District so that Lawrence and 
Garner’s constitutional claims could be heard. The Court of Appeals again rejected their 
claims that the law violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The court held 
that Bowers held precedent over the matter.
272
 The case was then appealed to the Supreme 
Court. The Court considered three questions: First, whether the Texas statute that singled out 
gays violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Second, whether the 
statute violated the petitioner’s right to liberty and privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Third, whether Bowers should be overturned. In the end, in a five to four decision authored 
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by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled the law did violate the Due Process Clause and 
the Equal Protection Clause, as well as violated Lawrence and Garner’s right to privacy. The 
Court ruled that Bowers, having been too narrow in its analysis, should be overturned. With 
this decision the Court struck down the remaining sodomy laws in the United States.
273
 
A Discussion of the Logic of Governmentality in the Lawrence Decision 
Second, I will discuss the logic of governmentality as it works in the Lawrence 
decision. The Court and its perspective may have a greater impact on the thinking of gay 
rights activists than the other way around. This can be seen, in part, through the utilization of 
the legal system by gay rights activists as the primary vehicle for advancing gay rights. 
Resistance to power plays a large role in determining how power acts upon the social body, 
because resistance is constitutive of power.
274
 This interconnectedness between power and 
resistance becomes evident by examining the arguments for gay rights articulated by gay 
rights activists in the Lawrence case. Golder states that the law changes as parties interpret 
and challenge the law, and novel concepts and understandings can emerge from 
interpretation. This is accomplished through briefs and oral arguments. All sides of a case 
develop their arguments, present their facts, and share ideas. The Court must then respond to 
these parties and their arguments by adopting some, rejecting others, and developing their 
own arguments. Further, both the courts and those who challenge the law respond to one 
another and shape each other’s arguments and perceptions.275 Because of the interplay 
between courts and respondents, the Court plays a role in determining what gay private life 
looks like, in the form of adopting the “like straight” language of gay rights activists. In so 
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doing, the Court realized that they had been too heavy-handed in dealing with gays.
276
 Justice 
Kennedy takes issue with the Bowers decision stating that “to say that the issue in Bowers 
was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put 
forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about 
the right to have sexual intercourse.”277 Here the “like straight” logic goes to work by 
comparing gay sex to straight sex, in the context of a marriage, and finds that, because gays 
are like straights, that gays are entitled to the same rights as straights. Gay relationships 
might not be a marriage but they are similar enough to warrant some protections, from 
Justice Kennedy’s standpoint. What we see with Lawrence is an attempt by the Court to 
address some of the limitations of both the earlier Bowers and Romer decisions. The logic of 
governmentality, which guides the Court and state institutions, must take into account how it 
manages society because “it is always necessary to suspect that one is governing too much… 
[The] imperatives of bio-political norms…lead to the creation of a coordinated and 
centralized administration of life [and] need to be weighed against the norms of economic 
processes and the norms derived from the democratization of sovereign subject of right.”278 
Mismanagement of society such as being too restrictive can lead to harm for the population, 
the economy, and the state. In this context, the Court has come to realize, starting with the 
Romer and continuing with Lawrence, that it has mismanaged the Court’s relationship with 
gays. Turning them into criminals and ostracizing them from the large community harmed 
society as a whole and that “when homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the 
State, that declaration in and of itself in an invitation to subject homosexual persons to 
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discrimination both in the public and private spheres,” which is something that the Lawrence 
Court is not willing to allow.
279
 Biopower is the composition of forces exerted by an 
individual or institution on themselves or another that governs the biological facets of our 
lives, including public hygiene, medicine, psychology, sexuality.
280
 This interest in the 
biological functioning of the human species is found in institutions such as hospitals, schools, 
in the social services, and in more abstract form, ideas such as sexuality. The state must 
weigh the benefits of intervening in the daily lives of citizens with the need to control these 
issues on the scale of the population as a whole. In the modern era, the biological becomes 
one more realm of study for the state in its quest to address all problems affecting the 
wellbeing of the population. When the state deals with problems such as sickness, disease, 
natural disasters, displacements, and changes in the environment, it must collect and analyze 
information to develop policies that address these problems, but do not unduly burden the 
prosperity of the population at large. The governing rationality of the modern state rests on 
the notion that social and economic practices must be allowed to develop without the 
overbearing influence of government and state intervention, because people will naturally 
come to the best solutions to their own problems. This notion comes out of the development 
of capitalism and subsequent economization of the functions of the state, imbuing them with 
the logic, reasoning, and analytical tools of capitalism which pushes the conclusion that the 
more freedom that the state allows to exist, democracy being just one element, the better the 
population flourishes and evolves along its own course. All of these factors being the case, 
too much direct intervention by the state could lead to a decline in the productivity, wealth, 
and security of the state. These sorts of bio-political issues are also best left for individuals to 
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decide with the government intervening later and at the margins as to not upset their smooth 
functioning. 
From here we get to the juridical apparatus’s intervention into the sexual sphere of 
life. For our purposes, an examination of how the Supreme Court has treated and shaped gay 
identity, we begin with a look back at the Bowers decision.  “All instances of governance 
contain elements of attempt and elements of incompleteness which at times may be seen as 
failure.”281 Bowers might be seen in this light and Lawrence is its correction. Bowers did not 
stop gays, or straights for that matter, from continuing to engage in acts of sodomy. For the 
majority of people committing these proscribed acts, the legal penalties associated with them 
don’t cross their mind. Thus, the law fails to regulate and control what it had intended to and 
in turn fails to govern. Justice Kennedy, in Lawrence, finds the narrow focus of the Bowers 
Court on sex acts unappealing.
282
 So Justice Kennedy identifies other aspects of proscribed 
relationships, stating that “the present case does not involve minors. It does not involve 
persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent 
might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution.”283 This 
immediately set the bounds for the sexual liberty at question in the case. This will not be a 
case that lifts up every individual’s right to sexual freedom, nor will it comment on many 
forms of relationship or sexual behavior. Instead, Justice Kennedy notes that Lawrence 
involved the transcendent dimensions of personal liberty for him meanings, notions of love, 
fidelity, and family.
284
 Bluestone states that “in proclaiming that the liberty in this case 
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extends to more transcendent dimensions, Justice Kennedy, in effect, announced that the 
issue presented goes beyond the issue of homosexuality.”285 Instead, it focuses on the real 
purpose of all sexual and romantic relationships whichfor Justice Kennedy is coupledom.
286
 
Couples represent a social good in the eyes of the state and so Justice Kennedy is 
structuring his argument and language to emphasize that sexuality is not about sexual 
gratification, but is merely one part of building a long lasting relationship between two 
people.
287
 His end goal is the reconceptualization of gay identity, not as a criminal other that 
exists outside of society, but as people who are like everyone else or just like their straight 
counterparts.
288
 Having people enter into long lasting relationships represents a more 
productive end and means of control than criminal penalty. Justice Kennedy argues that the 
Bowers decision demeans the issue that it was presented with by unfairly narrowing the 
scope of the case as to whether the Constitution protected a right to engage in homosexual 
sodomy.
289
 Justice Kennedy notes that, “After Griswold it was established that the right to 
make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct extends beyond the marital relationship… 
[Yet] to say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct 
demeans the claim…just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is 
simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.”290 On the one hand, Justice Kennedy 
claims that Griswold sets the precedent for sexual freedom beyond marriage, and on the 
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other, he claims that sexual freedom, in and of itself, is possibly demeaning.
291
 While this 
claim might seem perplexing, within the productive logic of governmentality, it makes sense. 
Justice Kennedy is building a case for coupledom by tying sexual activity with relationships 
“when sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct 
can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.”292 Given that Lawrence 
and Garner were not a couple and were engaged in casual sex makes this linkage between sex 
and marriage technically disingenuous. For Justice Kennedy, the Court is not illegitimate in 
its aims or methods when it strives to expand this coupled sexual liberty to gays and lesbians. 
In addition, the question of a right to privacy in intimate matters is a major theme 
found in Justice Kennedy’s opinion. Kennedy affirms that couples share a right to a private 
intimate life without the interference of the government. He demonstrates the influence of 
governmentality’s belief in allowing social interactions between people to happen naturally, 
that is to say, at the discretion of the parties involved, instead of being directly controlled by 
government.
293
 Relying on a number of historical studies on the origin of homosexuality as a 
scientific and medical term, Justice Kennedy argues that no longstanding tradition of 
prohibiting homosexual activity existed in the United States, because the term “homosexual” 
did not exist until the late 19
th
 century.
294
 Foucault, himself, confirms that homosexuality 
emerged as a medical term and an identity in the 19
th
 century.
295
 After making the argument 
that laws specifically targeting homosexual behavior are an invention of the mid-20
th
 century, 
Justice Kennedy lays out the Court’s belief that gay and lesbian couples should have the 
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same right to an intimate private life as heterosexual couples.
296
 Through this argument, he 
constructs an acceptable gay identity. Justice Kennedy states gay couples exist and in the 
same way as straight couples. Consequently, it would be unfair to criminalize gay behavior, 
because in some instances straight behavior is not criminalized.
297
 Even if sodomy was 
banned in all cases, the possibility of stigmatization and discrimination still remain for gays 
because that is the act that gays are linked to in the broader culture.
298
 Here we see the 
importance of normalization. What Justice Kennedy has done in his opinion is to create an 
acceptable norm for gay behavior. This standard happens to be the same one placed on 
straight couples. So if gays want legitimacy and recognition from the state, they need to 
conform to norms of the heterosexual couple. 
Productive Identity Construction in Lawrence 
By the time that Lawrence was decided, acceptance and visibility of gays and lesbians 
in the United States had increased.
299
 Likewise, they had become a far more active and vocal 
group within American society. Given the increasingly pluralistic culture, driven by 
individual wants and desires, morals can now begin to be driven like market forces. Not by 
direct economic means, though that is present, but in the sense that there is a “market place 
of ideas” where people are more and freer to choose what moral foundations they shall 
ascribe too. Justice Kennedy writes, “Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes 
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”300 By this point in 
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time, it could be argued that gays deserve rights because they represent one lifestyle among 
many. 
At the same time, the Court still defines a normal life in relation to a heterosexual 
standard. However, because Romer established that gays were, in fact, just like everyone 
else, this opened space for the Court to manipulate gay identity. Homosexuality, then, 
becomes just one facet of a person and they can still conform to the heterosexual norm, even 
if their partner is of the same sex. Because of this, the possibility emerged to grant gays the 
same right to form a couple that had been granted to straights.
301
 In response, a growing 
number of gay rights organizations, attempting to win rights such as marriage from the 
Courts, began to adopt an argument that gays were just like straights.
302
 Instead of pursuing 
alternatives to marriage, gays shore up the heterosexual institution of marriage.
303
 From here, 
we can see that Justice Kennedy latches onto the just like straights logic, and elaborates on 
what he sees as the heart of the Lawrence case: “To say the issue in Bowers was simply the 
right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just 
as it would demean a married couple were it to be said that marriage is simply the right to 
have sexual intercourse.”304 Kennedy’s like-straight analogy kicks into full gear later in the 
opinion. Justice Kennedy states that, “when sexuality finds overt expression in intimate 
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is 
more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the 
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right to make this choice.”305 Justice Kennedy conceptualizes gay relationships along the 
same lines as straight relationships.
306
 What Kennedy has attempted to do, through this “like-
straight” analogy, is reign in any possible conception of gay relationships that take place 
outside of committed, monogamous relationships. He makes the comparison between straight 
and gay couples here. This is the beginning of his “like-straight” analogy. Justice Kennedy 
props up the right to engage in sodomy with the plank of marriage. What was once morally 
unacceptable becomes acceptable by close association with coupledom. This coupling of 
gays is beneficial to the state because it puts them in the same sort of social arrangements as 
heterosexuals. Justice Kennedy realizes that coupledom can and does exist among gays and 
lesbians and accordingly they can also form a family.
307
 Justice Kennedy states explicitly that 
“our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and 
education…Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just 
as heterosexual persons do.”308 To reiterate, the family is important to the state because it is a 
site of childrearing, passing on the standards of conduct of society, a place of social support 
in hard economic times and old age, and provides stability in the lives of individuals. Carol 
Pateman makes the case that the intertwined nature of conjugal and paternal rights of fathers 
forms the basis of the social contract, and that it is the division of labor between men and 
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women that allows men to enter the productive realm of the economy and civil society.
309
 It 
is because of the development of capitalism and its destruction of the economically 
productive nature of the family that the state is cautious about directly interfering with the 
nature of family life. These social and economic factors make the family a desirable 
institution for the state to promote, and if gays and lesbians would like to mimic this straight 
institution, Justice Kennedy will provide them with the opportunity to do so.  
Governmentality attempts to create social conditions where values and goals can be 
determined by individuals. The social and sexual practices of the family, the most important 
social unit, and the site for the daily renewal of the individual for the perpetuation of the 
capitalist system are left to the individuals who comprise the family.
310
 Foucault writes that, 
“the game of liberalism-no interfering, allowing free movement, letting things follow their 
course, laisse faire, passer et aller-basically and fundamentally means acting so that reality 
develops, goes its way, and follows its own course according to the laws, principles, and 
mechanisms of reality itself.”311 However, this supposed freedom is tempered by the social 
norms that exist within society. Using Lawrence, the state granted recognition to the private 
intimate lives of gay people, but only if they conformed to social norms. When gays self-
govern and conform to the norms of heterosexuality, the state benefits because the gay 
couple will take on all of the obligations and responsibilities of a heteronormative 
relationship: the long lasting bond, the family, child rearing, economic self-reliance, and 
other stabilizing traits. In some sense, coupledom can be seen as a way of rehabilitating gays 
and molding them into productive citizens – just like straights. 
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Conclusion 
Throughout this paper, I have made the assertion and supported with evidence that the 
Supreme Court relies on the logic of governmentality in its decision-making process. The 
Court’s understanding of governmental logic explains the differing decisions in Bowers, 
Romer, and Lawrence. This is an important area of study, because the Supreme Court is one 
of only three branches of the United States government and an important arbiter in the 
American political system through its power to interpret the law. It is important to study the 
language the Court uses in its decisions, because the “social world is experienced through 
language and through the ways in which people label and value the context or environment in 
which lives are lived. Language plays a major part in constituting social subjects, the 
subjectivities and identities of persons, their relations and the field in which they exist”312 
LGBT activists and nongovernmental organizations have also favored the legal system as one 
of, if not the most, important site for obtaining recognition of the rights of LGBT people in 
the United States. Thus, these groups have portrayed LGBT people in a particular light that 
appeals to their judicial audience. This has lead to a narrowing of the acceptable bounds of 
the sexual liberty due to the preferences of the judicio-political apparatus. A Foucauldian 
analysis is important to the study of the courts because as a “methodology [it] sees economic, 
social and historical phenomena in ceaseless change produced by complexly interwoven 
contradictions arising from conflicting forces affecting the phenomena under 
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consideration.”313 As a method of analysis, it is attuned to studying how institutions change 
overtime, what opportunities are left unexplored, and what forces of power are being exerted. 
Before continuing with a final overview of my argument, it would be appropriate here 
to discuss a number of issues that this study does not consider, as well as possible limitations 
that must be taken into consideration. First, this paper has not addressed the two most recent 
Supreme Court decisions to deal with LGBT people. During the 2012 term, the Court 
decided United States v. Windsor, which declared that the Defense of Marriage Act, passed 
in 1996, was unconstitutional, and required federal recognition of same-sex marriages from 
states that offer them. In Hollingsworth v. Perry, also decided in the 2012 term, the majority 
denied standing to the appellants in the case; this allowed the California district court’s ruling 
to stand and for California same-sex marriages to resume. The present study cannot provide 
an explanation of these decisions because it has not analyzed them and because it is not 
necessary in order to establish the general trend of Court decision making in gay rights. I 
believe that an examination of these cases would reveal the “like straight” analogy used in 
Lawrence, and the state would seem to have adopted a strategy of assimilating gays into 
society, and thus making them productive citizens, but due to the time constraints I was 
unable to widen the scope of this paper to examine the cases. The analysis present in this 
paper is also not necessarily applicable to other types of cases that come before the Supreme 
Court. The subject of study in this paper was gay identity as defined by the Supreme Court. 
This subject has little to do with many other issues that the Court considers such as torts and 
economic issues. However, Foucault’s theory of governmentality could still be a useful tool 
                                                          
313
 Ahmet Kara, “Book Review”, Journal of Economic and Social Research 5, no. 2 (2003), 73-74. 
 90 
 
for political science scholars, as well as scholars from other fields, in studying the decision 
habits of the Supreme Court. 
Foucault’s notion of governmentality as a mode of analysis focuses on the 
government’s concern with knowledge of objects of study, their mechanisms of control, and 
the state’s rationality of government offers a useful tool for the study of the Supreme Court. 
Governmentality provides a useful and novel approach in determining the Court’s thinking in 
its decisions regarding gays. In the Bowers case, the Court held that the state had the right to 
criminalize “homosexual sodomy.” The logic behind this decision was that gays, in no way, 
resembled straights. Heterosexuals are important to the state and by extension the Court, in 
this case, because the heterosexual couple represents the basic social building block of 
American society. The family is a vital structure of the population because it is this 
institution that provides the primary point for socialization of individuals within the society 
and the most important productive and consumptive economic element. For this reason, it 
was acceptable to treat gays as criminals because their behavior in no way resembled the 
nuclear family. Gay intimate relations do not produce offspring, provide a space for child 
rearing, or lead to long lasting bonds and so the Court could find it acceptable to effectively 
criminalize homosexuality as a means of promoting, in their view, the heterosexual family as 
a superior social structure for the development of society. 
Romer, on the other hand, begins a reconsideration of the Court’s earlier thinking on 
homosexuality in Bowers. The Romer majority comes to the conclusion that gays are like any 
other group of people within the United States and, as such, should not be excluded from 
participating in the political process as well as denied a place in the public and private 
spheres due to their status as gay or lesbian. This can be seen as the Court considering the 
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incompleteness of the previous decision to consider a more productive end in dealing with 
the question of homosexuality. 
The Lawrence decision expands on the direction that earlier Romer decision began. 
The Court embraces the conclusion of Romer and takes it a step further with a reversal of the 
Bowers decision. The Court finds that gays are just like straight people, because it serves to 
reinforce the logic of governmentality. The Court’s logic changed when gays began to 
assimilate into the broader society and gay rights organizations took as their primary task 
obtaining same-sex marriage. As part of their strategy to obtain same-sex marriage, these 
organizations promoted the idea that gays were “just like straights.” This was a notion that 
the Court was more than willing to take up and reinforce, because of the all the benefits that 
that state would receive by having gays take on the same obligations and responsibilities as 
straight couples. Therefore, all the previous decisions regarding straight families also apply 
to the gay families. This is the case even if none of the parties to either case were a couple. In 
the end, the Court finds it acceptable, and most importantly productive, for the state to define 
a normalized identity for gay and lesbian people. 
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